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Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) Key Mediating Variable (KMV) Model has been 
demonstrated to be a useful means of exploring relationships between organizations.  
The model includes such key relational constructs as trust, commitment, cooperation, 
communication, shared values, and uncertainty, which have been studied extensively 
in the extant supply chain and marketing literatures.  However, at present no 
comprehensive test of buyer-supplier relationships has used the KMV Model as the 
basis for analysis.  In addition, no multi-industry study has applied the KMV Model 
to investigate its usefulness in other industries.  Finally, the applications of the KMV 
Model thus far have not included testing for its usefulness across national boundaries. 
The present study addresses all three of the gaps above.  Using responses from U.S.-
based purchasing professionals, the current study replicates the KMV Model within a 
new population and addresses the three gaps: First, by investigating the buyer-
supplier relationship; second, by sampling respondents from three industries 
(fabricated metal products; industrial machinery and equipment; and electronic and 
other electric equipment); and third, by collecting a sample with an internationally 
diverse supply base. 
The findings suggest that the KMV Model remains valid for predicting levels of trust 
and commitment in buyer-supplier relationships across the three industries.  In 
addition, the analyses suggest that the KMV Model is a reliable predictor for trust and 
commitment, as well as for their respective sources and outcomes, in differing 
cultures at the national level. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Businesses and their supply chains are becoming more global each day.  Many 
factors have combined to make sourcing outside the home country more financially 
lucrative for the firm.  However, this trend has occasionally been frustrated by the 
failure of undertakings and relationships with firms based in other countries.  Such 
setbacks can be particularly upsetting when the financial benefits of a given buyer-
supplier relationship should seem obvious to both parties.  In many cases the 
realization of benefits from such relationships is dependent on the acknowledgement 
of differences between the cultures of the home countries of the firms involved.  In 
fact, such differences may also influence the inception of the relationship itself. 
A noticeable trend over the past two decades has been a shift from domestic 
sourcing toward purchasing from international suppliers.  This trend is manifested not 
only in the percentage of inputs sourced overseas, but also in the number of different 
countries in which suppliers are located (Min and Galle 1991, Frear, Metcalf, and 
Alguire 1994).  Many factors have enabled increased international sourcing, including 
the lowering of obstacles to trade.  There are also considerations that make foreign 
sourcing attractive to buyers, including price, quality, and lack of domestic 
availability (Monczka and Giunipero 1984, Min and Galle 1991, Frear, Metcalf, and 
Alguire 1992, Birou and Fawcett 1993).  As is the case with selling in international 
markets, opening supply channels to international sources is not always seen merely 
as an attractive option, but as a strategic necessity (Ellram 1991, Monczka and Trent 
1992, Petersen, Frayer, and Scannell 2000). 
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As transactional relationships develop among buyers and international 
suppliers, a trend has been toward more stable, long-term arrangements.  These 
relationships help to dampen some of the volatile aspects of sourcing internationally 
(Min and Galle 1991).  However, the broadening of the scope of international 
purchasing coupled with the increasing depth and length of resultant buyer-supplier 
relationships has heightened the effect of intercultural differences among buyers and 
suppliers.  These differences may have a particularly strong impact in the case of trust 
and commitment between buyers and suppliers, which have been demonstrated to be 
essential to the success of buyer-supplier relationships (Ganesan 1994, Morgan and 
Hunt 1994).  Trust and commitment are theorized to have positive effects on channel 
relationships (Morgan and Hunt 1994), and indeed even on societies as a whole 
(Murphy 1999). 
When occurring regularly and over a long period of time, buyer-supplier 
transactions can assume the characteristics of an exchange relationship.  Such 
relationships, even between firms, may be based on behaviors described in terms 
commonly referring to interpersonal conditions such as trust and commitment.  As 
when individuals interact with others from foreign countries, the differences in 
acculturation between firms based in different nations can present impediments to the 
formation of relationships, and the derivation of benefits from such interaction.  
However, an understanding of the differences between national cultures and how they 
are manifested in interfirm relationships can reduce friction. 
The following section provides a background to the research, introducing the 
purpose and theoretical framework.  The framework is based on two primary streams: 
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Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) Key Mediating Variable Model of interorganizational 
relationships, which includes twelve constructs of interorganizational behavior 
centered around trust and commitment; and Hofstede’s (2001) five dimensions of 
national culture: individualism-collectivism, long-term orientation, masculinity-
femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance.  An abbreviated literature 
review follows, summarizing key sources studying the interactions of culture and 
buyer-supplier relationships.  Finally, Table 1 is included as a reference to key 
concepts used throughout the piece. 
Research Background
Morgan and Hunt (1994) present a model (Figure 1) of interorganizational 
relationships based on trust and commitment, the Key Mediating Variable (or KMV) 
Model.  The model is rooted in social or relational exchange theory.  This theory is 
based on the premise that individuals form relationships based on mutual exchange to 
achieve benefits; with the passage of time and the conclusion of mutually beneficial 
exchanges, trust and commitment develop (Thibaut and Kelley 1959, Blau 1964).  
When applied to the interaction of businesses with their customers, corporate or 
individual, social exchange theory is the basis of relational marketing.  In the context 
of relational marketing, the exchange between customer and vendor is viewed not 
merely at the level of the individual transaction, but in terms of relationships (Dwyer, 
Schurr, and Oh 1987, Morgan and Hunt 1994).  In Morgan and Hunt’s model, trust 
and commitment mediate the relationship between five antecedent variables (benefits, 
termination costs, communication, opportunism, and shared values), and five 
relationship outcome variables (propensity to leave, acquiescence, cooperation, 
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uncertainty, and functional conflict).  The model further proposes no direct 
relationships between the antecedent and outcome variables, thus establishing 
commitment and trust as key mediators. 
Figure 1: The Key Mediating Variable of Relationship Marketing (Source: Morgan and Hunt 1994) 
 
This research seeks to build upon Morgan and Hunt’s model by incorporating 
effects based on differences between cultures.  Individuals in different cultures form 
bonds and view relationships in different ways.  Behaviors and conditions that are 
viewed as beneficial in one culture may be perceived as neutral or even harmful in 
another.  A model proposed in this research will investigate whether cultural distance 
has effects upon the relationships in the KMV Model.  The intercultural framework is 
based on Hofstede’s (2001) typology of dimensions of national culture.  Hofstede’s 
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dimensions have been demonstrated as substantiating cultural differences at the 
national level. For relational marketing, the model of Morgan and Hunt (1994) is 
adopted.  Table 1 presents formal definitions of the terms discussed in the research, 
including the constructs in Morgan and Hunt’s model.  The differences in cultural 
characteristics between the buyer and supplier are one possible explanation as to why 
high or low levels of trust and commitment exist in international exchange 
relationships.  In addition, the differences between cultures may either increase or 
diminish the benefits of exchange rooted in relationship commitment.  For certain 
industries or products where the benefits of extended social exchange may outweigh 
those of sourcing through markets (as with goods of high complexity, goods only 
available from a small number of suppliers, and/or industries with high levels of 
specialization or innovation, which therefore entail a high volume of communication), 
differences among national cultures can play a key role in hastening and 
strengthening the creation of solid relationships between buyers and suppliers, at the 
firm as well as interpersonal level.  Here the author proposes that differences between 
buyer and supplier in national culture as defined along the dimensions of Hofstede 
(2001) significantly affect the trust- and commitment-building processes, as well as 
the benefits, of a buyer-supplier relationship (as modeled by Morgan and Hunt 1994) 
that spans international borders.  A major research question to be addressed here is: 
How do national culture differences influence the fostering of trust and commitment 
in transnational buyer-supplier relationships? 
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Dimensions of National Culture
Intercultural variations influence the nature of interorganizational interactions.  
Cultural differences may create barriers in business relationships (Anderson and 
Weitz 1989, Hewett and Bearden 2001).  Differences among cultures have also been 
cited as an important challenge to international sourcing (Min and Galle 1991, Birou 
and Fawcett 1993). 
In his study of over 88,000 employees from over forty countries and regions 
of a multinational corporation based in the U.S., Hofstede (2001) finds variation 
among national cultures along four dimensions:  
Power distance, which concerns the handling by a society of human inequalities of 
prestige, wealth, and power.  A high index of power distance is found for a country 
where large inequalities exist. 
 
Uncertainty avoidance, which denotes “the extent to which members of a culture feel 
threatened by uncertain or unknown situations.”  A culture with a high index of 
uncertainty avoidance is highly rule-oriented, encourages employment stability, and 
strongly favors technological solutions.  
 
Individualism-Collectivism describes the relationship between the individual and the 
collective organization or society.  The index is called individualism, and a high value 
indicates that a given nation’s culture emphasizes, for example, the importance of 
employees’ personal time and freedom and challenge in the workplace (as opposed to 
training and the use of job skills). 
 
Masculinity-Femininity, like individualism, is comprised of a two-pole continuum.  
Societies rated as more masculine attribute more importance to goals such as careers 
and money, while cultures rated more feminine rank social goals such as 
relationships, lending help to others, and the physical environment more highly. 
 
These four dimensions have been validated in many studies (Søndergaard 1994).  
Since the original study, the scope has been expanded to over fifty different countries 
and regions.  In addition, a fifth independent dimension has been found and similarly 
validated since the publication of the above four dimensions (Hofstede 2001): 
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Long-Term Orientation refers to a culture’s valuing persistence or perseverance over 
quick results.   Societies with high Long-Term Orientation Indices, for example, favor 
the ordering of status in relationships; place a low value on leisure time; and 
emphasize the building of relationships and market position in business over “the 
bottom line.” 
 
Most commonly, individualism-collectivism has been used as the dimension 
associated with trust.  Individualism-collectivism has been proposed as a direct 
influence on cooperation within multinational organizations (Chen, Chen, and Meindl 
1998).  Empirically, the individualism-collectivism dimension has been modeled as a 
moderating variable in the trust-cooperation relationship of marketing headquarters 
and subsidiaries (Hewett and Bearden 2001).  Incorporation of multiple dimensions 
has been rarer, either conceptually or empirically (Søndergaard 1994, Doney, 
Cannon, and Mullen 1998, Nyaw and Ng 1994). 
Without replication or usage of the indices associated with Hofstede’s 
dimensions, other studies have nevertheless confirmed some aspects of Hofstede’s 
findings.  For example, Akaah (1990) found no significant differences among ethical 
attitudes in the “Anglosphere” countries of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the 
United States.  Similarly, individualism, whether as operationalized by Hofstede 
(Nyaw and Ng 1994) or based on different theory such as the philosophy of 
utilitarianism (Wood et al. 1988), has been hypothesized as correlated with tolerance 
of certain unethical behaviors in the workplace.  Schwartz (1994), with a sample 
encompassing data from 44 countries, like Hofstede also examines culture at the 
national level.  He identifies seven categories of culture: conservatism, hierarchy, 
mastery, affective autonomy, intellectual autonomy, egalitarian commitment, and 
harmony.  He finds positive correlations at the national level between harmony and 
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uncertainty avoidance; between egalitarian commitment, affective autonomy, and 
intellectual autonomy and individualism; and between mastery and masculinity.  In 
addition, Schwartz finds a negative correlation between hierarchy and individualism. 
Power Distance 
Hofstede (2001, p. xix) defines the Power Distance dimension as “the extent to which 
the less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that 
power is distributed unequally” and is based on “the degree of human inequality that 
underlies the functioning of each particular society.”  Inequalities in society take the 
forms of physical and intellectual characteristics; social status and prestige; wealth; 
power; and laws, rights, and rules.  Two countervailing forces can be discerned in 
each society: one attempting to eliminate status inconsistencies among the areas 
mentioned above, and a counterforce attempting to maintain equality by offsetting 
rank in one of the areas against another.  Writes Hofstede, “[t]he battle between the 
two forces . . . is one of the basic issues in any human society” (p. 80). 
In organizations, inequalities are manifested most clearly in power 
distribution, which is formalized in organizational hierarchies.  The supervisor-
subordinate relationship bears resemblance to the fundamental relationships of 
parent-child and teacher-pupil.  Comments Hofstede, “[a]s family and school 
environments differ strongly among cultures, we can expect to find the traces of these 
differences in the exercise of power in hierarchies” (82). 
 Hofstede operationalizes power distance as “a measure of the interpersonal 
power or influence of B [boss] and S [subordinate] as perceived by the less powerful 
of the two, S.”  On a national level, culture defines the power distance level “at which 
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the tendency of the powerful to maintain or increase power distances and the 
tendency of the less powerful to reduce them will find their equilibrium” (pp. 83-84).  
For example, one questionnaire item measuring the power distance dimension queries 
the respondent on the frequency of employees being afraid to express disagreements 
with their managers in the workplace (p. 472). 
 The Power Distance Index (PDI) is calculated based on data regarding 
subordinates’ perceptions and preferences for managers.  Country indices were then 
calculated by adding a constant to the PDI.  Hofstede offers several key differences 
between low and high PDI societies as demonstrated in the work environment.  For 
example, in a low PDI society organization there is a smaller proportion of 
supervisory personnel and less concentration of authority than in a high PDI society 
(p. 107). 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
The dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance is defined by Hofstede as “the extent to 
which a culture programs its members to feel uncomfortable or comfortable in 
unstructured situations,” which are “novel, unknown, surprising, [and] different from 
usual.”  “The basic problem involved is the degree to which a society tries to control 
the uncontrollable” (pp. xix-xx).  As the presence of inequality prompts a response in 
a society evidenced by power distance, so the presence of uncertainty elicits varying 
levels of attempts to adapt to it.   The national Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) is 
an expression of a national culture’s norm for “intolerance for ambiguity” based on 
“tendencies toward prejudice, rigidity and dogmatism, intolerance of different 
opinions, traditionalism, superstition, racism, and ethnocentrism” (p. 146).  At the 
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national cultural level, societies use technology, law, and religion to respond to 
uncertainty in life. 
 At the organizational level, firms may adapt to uncertainty through 
technology, rules and rituals.  Technology responds to uncertainty by increasing the 
predictability of outcomes.  Rules are a means of reducing internal uncertainty 
resulting from member or stakeholder behavior.  Rituals are a perceived means of 
controlling the future, whether rational or irrational.  Examples in the workplace 
include business meetings; training programs; writing and filing memos and reports; 
accounting; and computer simulations (pp. 147-48). 
 Three items were used to calculate the national Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
(UAI) scores.  They related to respondents’ agreement that company rules should not 
be broken; intention to remain with the company as measured in length of time; and 
stress, as expressed as the frequency of feelings of nervousness or tension at work.  
Hallmarks of high UAI countries include a stronger tendency to remain with the same 
employer; higher average seniority; lower ambition for advancement; stronger appeal 
of technological solutions; and higher preferences for larger organizations than in low 
UAI countries (pp. 160, 169-70). 
Individualism-Collectivism 
As defined by Hofstede, Individualism is “the degree to which individuals are 
supposed to look after themselves or remain integrated into groups, usually around 
the family.”  The positioning of itself between individualism and collectivism (the 
polar opposite of individualism) “is a very basic problem all societies face” (p. xx).  
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Broadly speaking, this dimension refers to the relationship between the individual and 
the collectivity. 
 Individualism-collectivism has implications in the realm of self-concept and at 
the societal level.    For example, more collectivist societies exhibit wider patterns of 
living in extended families (versus nuclear families in more individualist societies) 
and communications in collectivist societies are more high-context (less explicit) in 
nature than in individualist societies (p. 210).  Individualistic societies rest on 
expectations that each person look after himself and his family only, while collectivist 
societies rest on expectations that each person be integrated into strong and cohesive 
in-groups, which provide life-long protection in exchange for unquestioning loyalty 
(p. 225).  Hofstede also points out that individualism-collectivism is the dimension 
most associated, at least statistically, with a society’s degree of modernity –measured 
in terms of a country’s level of economic development (p. 211). 
 As one may expect, individualism-collectivism has implications in the 
workplace as well.  For example, collectivism is exhibited when compliance with 
organizational requirements takes on a more “moral” aspect, while a more 
“calculative” involvement may exist where individualism prevails.  In addition, 
people with a more “local” preoccupation (one concerned with problems internal to 
the organization) are more influential in a collectivist culture, while a “cosmopolitan” 
person (one who maintains minimal relations within the organization but considers 
himself more integrated with the outside world) holds more influence in individualist 
cultures (pp. 212-13).  The Individualism Index (IDV) was derived from items 
relating to work goals, including the mean values for personal time, freedom, 
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challenge, use of skills, physical conditions, and training.  The first three are 
associated with high IDV, the latter three with low IDV.  Distinguishing 
characteristics of low-IDV societies versus high-IDV cultures as manifested in the 
work environment include a higher career importance attached to knowing the right 
people versus having the right abilities; a preference for group decisions over 
individual decisions; a greater emphasis on belonging (“membership ideal”) than on 
individual initiative and achievement (“leadership ideal”); and a tendency to view 
activities as imposed by context rather than as self-started as in high-IDV cultures 
(pp. 226-27). 
Masculinity-Femininity 
The cultural dimension of Masculinity-Femininity is defined by Hofstede as “the 
distribution of emotional roles between the genders, which is another fundamental 
problem for any society for which a range of solutions are found; it opposes ‘tough’ 
masculine to ‘tender’ feminine societies” (p. xx).  The primary societal concern 
regards the implications biological differences between the sexes have for their roles, 
social and emotional.  In the strictest sense, only behaviors directly associated with 
procreation (i.e., childbearing and child begetting) are inherently “masculine” or 
feminine;” other roles are based on choices made arbitrarily and within a cultural 
context of norms and traditions (pp. 279-80).  In short, masculinity refers to a society 
in which social roles of the sexes are distinct, while femininity refers to a society in 
which the social roles of the sexes overlap, namely, that “both men and women are 
supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life” (p. 297). 
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In the workplace, masculinity-femininity is exhibited in various ways.  As 
with individualism-collectivism, Hofstede found differences in work goals to be a key 
area.  The study found that men found “ego” goals of advancement, earnings, 
training, and “up-to-dateness” more important, while women found “social” goals of 
friendly atmosphere, position security, physical conditions, manager relations, and 
cooperation more important (p. 281).  Another example of cultural expression of 
masculinity-femininity in the workplace is in compensation, where feminine cultures 
are more concerned with equality and mutual solidarity, whereas masculine cultures 
tend to compensate based on merit and performance.  Masculinity may be most 
succinctly expressed as associated with living in order to work, and femininity as 
working in order to live. 
 The national Masculinity Index (MAS), like IDV, was measured from items 
relating to work ideals.  These ideals included many of those listed above: what is 
desirable in a manager, cooperation, desirable area, employment security, challenge, 
advancement, recognition, and earnings.  The first four corresponded with low MAS, 
the latter four with high MAS (p. 284).  Some of the values evidenced in the 
workplace that distinguish low-MAS societies from high-MAS societies are the lack 
of work as central in a person’s “life space;” empathy with others regardless of group; 
consensus-seeking by managers versus managerial decisiveness and competitiveness 
in high-MAS societies; resolution of conflicts via problem solving, compromise and 
negotiation versus conflict resolution via denial or fighting until one party prevails; 
and competitive advantages in service industries, live products, or biochemistry as 
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opposed to competitive advantages in manufacturing industries, price competition, 
heavy products and bulk chemistry (pp. 298, 318). 
Long-Term Orientation 
Hofstede defines Long-term Orientation as “the extent to which a culture programs its 
members to accept delayed gratification of their material, social, and emotional 
needs” (p. xx).  This dimension did not emerge in Hofstede’s original IBM study but 
was defined as a result of a Chinese value survey based on suggestions by Chinese 
scholars of values related to the teachings of Confucius.  Among the factors 
contributing to long-term orientation are “moral discipline,” “integration” (correlating 
with individualism-collectivism), and “human-heartedness” (correlating with 
masculinity-femininity) (pp. 351-53).  In short, long-term orientation refers to “the 
fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular, perseverance and 
thrift,” as opposed to the fostering of past- and present-oriented virtues, “in particular, 
respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’ and fulfilling social obligations” (p. 359). 
 In society, long-term orientation emerges most notably in relationships.  In the 
family, an example is obedience relationships, which even among siblings are 
emphasized to a greater extent in long-term oriented cultures, as opposed to short-
term oriented societies.  In addition, marriage is viewed as a more pragmatic than 
romantic arrangement in a long-term oriented society (pp. 359-61). 
Long-term orientation is revealed in the work environment and in the conduct of 
business.  For example, firms in cultures with a more long-term orientation will tend 
toward building up strong market positions and not to expect immediate results.  
Control systems are more conscious of the most recent financial results in short-term 
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oriented cultures.  In addition, the possession and maintenance of personal, 
horizontally coordinated networks (e.g., guanxi in Asia) links more closely the 
spheres of family and business. One salient characteristic of long-term oriented 
cultures is that of the importance of compliance within a larger context of vertical 
cooperation (Hofstede 2001, 361-62).  Long-term orientation is also manifested in the 
business world by emphasizing the building and maintenance of relationships over 
short-term results.  For example, in long-term oriented cultures, the building of strong 
market position generally renders compromising immediate results, or even less 
immediate goals such as quarterly or even annual profits, acceptable (Hofstede 2001, 
361).    Similarly, Lusch and Brown (1996, 24-25) note that parties in an extended 
relationship expect to accept short-term disadvantages and that long-term orientation 
reflects the closeness of such a relationship. 
The Effects of National Culture on Buyer-Supplier Relationships
In a conceptual paper discussing trust and corporate alliances, Ariño et al. (2001, p. 
114) write, “National differences in value systems, cultural traits, and institutions are 
bound to have a significant impact on both the degree of trust initially accorded 
economic actors as well as on the rate at which relational quality improves or 
deteriorates.”  There is much commentary in the extant literature on the influences of 
national culture on interfirm relationships, including many that have operationalized 
national culture along one or more of Hofstede’s dimensions. Not only have these 
works studied buyer-supplier relationships but also joint ventures, consortia and 
cartels, licensing, franchising, management contracts, and various combinations 
among them.  While there are several legal and financial dissimilarities among the 
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various relationships studied, they are nevertheless relevant because they all involve a 
form of exchange and they all consider problems associated with developing such 
agreements across national as well as organizational cultures (Graham 1988).   
 In a conceptual piece on international buyer-seller face-to-face interactions, 
Kale and Barnes (1992) model “national character” along Hofstede’s dimensions.  
Along with organizational culture and individual personality characteristics of the 
actors involved, they propose national culture as a factor influencing the style and 
content of cross-national interactions.  For example, a buyer from a high uncertainty 
avoidance culture would be predicted to prefer attributes in an offering that reduce 
uncertainty, such as a superior warranty, established brand name, or strong 
guarantees.  In a highly collectivistic society, less emphasis will be placed on variety 
and pleasure attributes, while high power distance cultures would opt for products 
with high “status” value over more functional products.  In a study of modes of 
foreign direct investment, Kogut and Singh (1988) combined Hofstede’s first four 
dimensions into an aggregate “cultural distance” measure.  Cultural distance between 
the home country of the entering firm and the host country was found to be an 
influence on the mode of foreign direct investment. 
 Barkema and Vermuelen (1997) perform a rare longitudinal test of Hofstede’s 
five dimensions.  Specifically, they study the “survival” rates of over 800 foreign 
entries of 25 Dutch multinational corporations in international joint ventures through 
almost three decades (1966-94).  They find international joint venture survival to be 
negatively associated with distances in long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance, 
and (to a lesser extent) masculinity.  They also find that differences in uncertainty 
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avoidance and long-term orientation also reduce a firm’s inclination to establish 
international joint ventures in the focal host country.  Another important finding is 
that there is no decrease in their sample of the effects of cultural distance between the 
two time periods in the study (1966-1980 and 1981-1994), thus presenting support for 
the durability of Hofstede’s dimensions over a long period. 
 Chen, Chen, and Meindl (1998), in a conceptual piece, focus on the relation 
between cooperation and the individualism-collectivism dimension.  They propose 
that cooperation may increase in either individualist or collectivist cultures, 
depending on whether such cooperation enhances personal identities (better for 
individualist cultures) or group identities (collectivist).  In addition, they also propose 
individualism-collectivism as associated to the trust-cooperation relationship.  They 
distinguish between cognition-based trust, which is built on role performance 
knowledge (e.g., performance behaviors conveying competence and reliability), and 
affect-based trust, which is built on emotional bonds between the actors (especially 
non-task relational activities that convey personal concern for the other rather than 
self-interest).  They also propose that explicit cooperative rules will be more effective 
in individualist cultures in promoting cooperation, whereas social pressures are more 
effective toward the same end in collectivist cultures. 
Hewett and Bearden (2001) similarly focus on the individualism-collectivism 
dimension and trust.  They model individualism as moderating the relationship of 
trust to cooperation, hypothesizing that trust will influence cooperation more strongly 
in highly collectivistic cultures than in highly individualistic cultures.  The 
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individualism-collectivism dimension referred to the global marketing subsidiary’s 
culture, rather than that of the headquarters. 
 Doney, Cannon, and Mullen (1998) consider the relationship between national 
culture and trust.  Like Doney and Cannon (1997), they conceptualize five distinct 
trust-building processes: 1) calculative (trustor’s cost-benefit calculation of target 
acting opportunistically), 2) prediction (development of trustor confidence in the 
predictability of target’s actions), 3) intentionality (trustor evaluations of trustee’s 
motivations), 4) capability (trustor’s assessment of target’s competence), and 5)
transference (trustor’s drawing on third-party proof of target’s trustworthiness).  They 
posit that Hofstede’s first four dimensions of culture influence the choice of trust-
forming process (p. 609). 
 In a conceptual paper concerning global strategic alliances, Parkhe (1991) 
proposes several effects of culture on such interfirm arrangements.  Power distance, 
for example, is posited to have the most significant influence on alliance structure and 
communication.  Uncertainty avoidance, however, is posited as having the greatest 
influence on the choices of projects and information and control systems.  Parkhe 
proposes that the individualism-collectivism dimension affects accountability and 
performance evaluation systems, while masculinity-femininity most significantly 
influences organizational design and alliance reward systems (pp. 594-95). 
 In a conceptual article on international cooperative ventures, Tallman and 
Shenkar (1994) use two of Hofstede’s dimensions to test firm choice of international 
equity joint ventures versus contractual joint ventures.  They propose that firms are 
more likely to opt for equity joint ventures when parent firms are from more 
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individualistic cultures.  Uncertainty avoidance in the parent firm’s national culture is 
also posited to have a positive relationship with firm inclination toward equity joint 
ventures over contractual joint ventures. 
Graham (1988), in a study of negotiation outcomes, includes the power 
distance dimension as an independent variable.  He hypothesizes that buyers in high-
PDI cultures will realize higher profits than in low-PDI cultures, and that the disparity 
between buyers’ and sellers’ profits will be higher in high-PDI cultures than in low-
PDI cultures.  These hypotheses are based on theory that norms governing internal 
boss-subordinate relationships also govern buyer-supplier relationships (supplier as 
subordinate to the buyer) in many societies (p. 477). 
Wong and Chan (1999), in a paper on relationship marketing, study 
relationship building from the Chinese guanxi perspective.  Lin and Germain (1998) 
propose cultural similarity as a variable influencing international joint venture 
performance, but do not incorporate Hofstede’s dimensions in operationalizing 
cultural similarity. 
Contribution
This research aims to add to the current literature by expanding upon the work 
of Morgan and Hunt in three ways.  First, Morgan and Hunt examine the supplier-
retailer relationship.  This research will investigate a type of relationship further 
upstream in the supply chain, that between industrial buyers and their suppliers.  
Buyer-seller relationships at this stage are predicted to have a strong interpersonal 
component wherein conceptions of trust and commitment are even more critical, and 
focused more on product and person than on brand.  Second, Morgan and Hunt’s 
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sample consists of members of one industry.  Since the sampling frame will include 
three diverse industries, the research is expected to be more generalizable.  Finally, 
the proposed research will include buyers from all regions of the U.S., and suppliers 
from around the globe.  Indeed, for industrial buyer-supplier relationships the 
international component is large and often diverse (Min and Galle 1991, Frear, 
Metcalf, and Alguire 1994).  The present research replicates the KMV Model with a 
sampling frame possessing the above characteristics.  The replication will confirm 
whether the KMV Model holds in different industries, with a broad supply base, and 
at the industrial buyer level.  The proposed research will also provide an investigation 
into the effects cultural distance has on the mechanisms that lead to trust and 
commitment, critical where industries involving a large degree of international 
sourcing and high levels of complexity and innovation are concerned. 
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Table 1: Key Terms 
TRUST:  Exists when one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability 
and integrity (Morgan and Hunt 1994, Moorman, Deshpandé, and Zaltman 1993) 
 
COMMITMENT:  An exchange partner’s believing that an ongoing relationship 
with another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it (Morgan 
and Hunt 1994) 
 
RELATIONSHIP TERMINATION COSTS:  All expected losses from 
termination; results from the perceived lack of comparable potential alternative 
partners, relationship dissolution expenses, and/or substantial switching costs 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994) 
 
RELATIONSHIP BENEFITS:  an evaluation of outcomes given comparison level 
among alternatives (Morgan and Hunt 1994, Thibaut and Kelley 1959) 
 
SHARED VALUES:  The extent to which partners have beliefs in common about 
what behaviors, goals, and policies are important or unimportant, appropriate or 
inappropriate, and right or wrong (Morgan and Hunt 1994) 
 
COMMUNICATION:  the formal as well as informal sharing of meaningful and 
timely information between firms (Morgan and Hunt 1994, Anderson and Narus 
1990) 
 
OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR:  deceit-oriented violation of implicit or explicit 
promises about one’s appropriate or required role behavior (Morgan and Hunt 1994, 
Williamson 1975) 
 
ACQUIESCENCE:  the degree to which a partner accepts or adheres to another’s 
specific requests or policies (Morgan and Hunt 1994, Steers 1977) 
 
PROPENSITY TO LEAVE:  the perceived likelihood that a partner will terminate 
the relationship in the (reasonably) near future (Morgan and Hunt 1994) 
 
COOPERATION:  refers to situations in which parties work together to achieve 
mutual goals (Morgan and Hunt 1994, Anderson and Narus 1990) 
 
FUNCTIONAL CONFLICT:  the result of disputes between exchange partners 
being resolved amicably (Morgan and Hunt 1994, Anderson and Narus 1990) 
 
UNCERTAINTY:  the extent to which a partner has enough information to make 
key decisions, can predict the consequences of those decisions, and has confidence in 







INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM:  a dimension of culture defined by its poles; 
the degree to which individuals are supposed to look after themselves (individualism) 
or remain integrated into groups (collectivism) (Hofstede 2001) 
 
MASCULINITY-FEMININITY:   a dimension of culture defined by its poles; the 
distribution of emotional roles between the genders, which is another fundamental 
problem for any society for which a range of solutions are found; it opposes ‘tough’ 
masculine to ‘tender’ feminine societies (Hofstede 2001) 
 
POWER DISTANCE:  the extent to which the less powerful members of 
organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally 
(Hofstede 2001) 
 
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE:  the extent to which a culture programs its 
members to feel uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations that are 
novel, unknown, surprising, and different from usual (Hofstede 2001) 
 
LONG-TERM ORIENTATION:  the extent to which a culture programs its 





The dissertation is presented in six chapters; following the introduction are 
five chapters.  The following figure describes the overview of the dissertation: 
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The second chapter surveys the extant literature concerning the major constructs of 
the KMV Model, as well as the relevant literature treating social exchange theory, 
transaction cost theory, international sourcing, and international culture as defined in 
the five dimensions proposed by Hofstede (2001).  The third chapter presents the 
KMV Model and the hypotheses to be tested.  The fourth chapter concerns the data 
collection and measurement for testing and replicating the model.  The fifth chapter 
describes the results obtained for the measurement and structural models, and 
compares the replicated KMV with a rival model.  Chapter 6 discusses the results.  
Chapter 7 provides a conclusion and direction for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter summarizes the previous research literature on trust and 
relationship commitment; other constructs related to them in the Key Mediating 
Variable Model of Morgan and Hunt (1994); the significance of trust and 
commitment to social/relational exchange and transaction cost theories; the rise in 
importance of international buyer supplier relationships; and the effects of national 
culture on organizations.  Specifically, the literature concerning commitment and trust 
and the related constructs of relationship benefits, relationship termination costs, 
shared values, communication, opportunistic behavior, propensity to leave, 
acquiescence, cooperation, functional conflict, and uncertainty are discussed.  Next, 
the relevant social/relational exchange theory literature is discussed, which helps to 
illuminate the nature of informal/non-contractual business-to-business relationships 
and their formation.  A discussion of the transaction cost analysis literature, which 
also helps to explain interfirm relationships, follows.  The next section summarizes 
the literature on the phenomenon of international sourcing, including its causes and 
benefits.  Finally, there follows a discussion of the influence of national culture on 
organizations as presented by Hofstede (2001), and a summary of literature that has 
applied one or more of Hofstede’s five national culture dimensions of uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity-femininity, individualism-collectivism, power distance, and 




The Key Mediating Variable Model
The following section presents a brief discussion of trust, commitment, their 
sources and their outcomes in papers other than Morgan and Hunt.  In the Key 
Mediating Variable (KMV) model, Morgan and Hunt (1994) present trust and 
commitment as indispensable to successful business-to-business relationships (see 
Figure 1, p. 6).  In addition, trust and commitment are presented as the keys to 
understanding how important conditions and behaviors –shared values, 
communication, relationship termination costs, relationship benefits, and 
opportunistic behavior: the precursors of trust and commitment-- in marketing 
relationships relate to outcomes –reduced propensity to leave, cooperation, 
acquiescence, functional conflict, and decreased uncertainty-- relevant to 
effectiveness and satisfaction. 
 The KMV Model or its component relationships has been cited extensively in 
the marketing and supply chain literatures to explain important aspects of long-term 
buyer-supplier (or other types of marketing) relationships and as the basis for 
similarly modeled relationships.  Other studies have, like Morgan and Hunt, presented 
trust and commitment as crucial in influencing relationship outcomes (Mohr, Fisher, 
and Nevin 1996; Holm et al. 1996; Smith and Barclay 1997; Doney and Cannon 
1997; Siguaw, Simpson, and Baker 1998; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999; 
Moore and Cunningham 1999; Jap 1999; Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Hewett and 
Bearden 2001; Chaudhori and Holbrook 2001; Friman et al. 2002).  In addition, 
several studies have also included one or more of the sources and outcomes as 
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constructs of interest in their models, including acquiescence and cooperation 
(Hewett and Bearden 2001); shared values (McAfee, Glassman, and Honeycutt 
2002); and relationship termination costs, benefits, shared values, and communication 
(Friman et al. 2002). 
 The following sections discuss the twelve constructs in the KMV Model 
individually, beginning with the key mediators themselves.  Trust and commitment 
are salient constructs in the relational marketing literature.  This prominence derives 
from their similar centrality in the social/relational exchange theory literature, as both 
for the bases for repeated exchange.  For some of the constructs, parallel concepts are 
also treated even where not coextensive with Morgan and Hunt’s conceptualizations. 
Relationship Commitment 
Commitment is an important construct in the literature concerning 
relationships; it is essential to provide any duration to relationships, business or 
personal.  Seminal literature in studying interpersonal relationships presents 
commitment as a critical component (Blau 1964).  Relationship commitment is 
defined by Morgan and Hunt as “an exchange partner believing that an ongoing 
relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at 
maintaining it” (p. 23).  Commitment is prevalent as a dependent variable in models 
of buyer-supplier relationships (Wilson 1995).  Organizational commitment, i.e., 
commitment in a firm’s internal relationships, has been studied extensively (Reichers 
1985, Steers 1977).  In one important social exchange piece cited by Morgan and 
Hunt for their model, Cook and Emerson (1978) speculate that commitment is “an 
important concept separating social exchange theory from strictly economic theory” 
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(p. 737).  Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) offer one of the earliest conceptualizations of 
commitment in buyer-supplier relationships, and refer to commitment as “an implicit 
or explicit pledge of relational continuity between exchange partners.”  They 
characterize the commitment phase of buyer-supplier relationship development as one 
wherein “. . . shared value systems ensure sustained interdependence” (p. 19).  
Likewise, Morgan and Hunt’s model incorporates shared values as a precursor to 
relationship commitment along with relationship benefits, relationship termination 
costs, and trust itself. 
As noted above, much of the literature makes reference to a relationship 
between trust and commitment, often including one in a definition of the other.  In the 
KMV Model, trust is proposed as both a key mediator and as a precursor to 
relationship commitment. 
Trust 
Trust is critical to relationship formation and maintenance, as even repeated 
interactions between parties conducted without trust more resemble series of 
transactions that functioning relationships.  The marketing literature has been 
consistent in affirming trust as antecedent to commitment (Geyskens at al. 1999, 
Morgan and Hunt 1994, Ganesan 1994, Jap 1999).  Trust is an important construct 
when viewing organizational relationship exchanges.  According to Blau (1964, p. 
94), “Only social exchange tends to engender feelings of personal obligation, 
gratitude, and trust; purely economic exchange as such does not,” and he suggests 
that repeated exchange creates trust between groups.  Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) 
state that trust is important for both parties to understand and develop expectations in 
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a relational contract.  In an important early piece on the exchange perspective toward 
marketing, Houston and Gassenheimer (1987, p. 10) note that “[t]he implementation 
varies . . . but the goal [of marketing] is still the development of trust between 
exchange partners that leads to a long-term relationship,” and also concur with Blau 
(1964) that development of exchange relationships over time occurs through 
reciprocal behaviors. 
As with commitment, trust is becoming a more important construct in the 
supply chain literature as an element of successful logistics relationship performance 
(Bowersox et al. 1989, Tate 1996).  For buyer-supplier relationships, Zaheer, 
McEvily, and Perrone (1998, p. 21) define trust as the belief that the partner “can be 
relied upon to fulfill obligations, will behave in a predictable manner, and will act and 
negotiate fairly when the possibility of exploitation exists.”  Moore (1998) adopts a 
similar definition. 
Sources of Commitment and Trust
The KMV Model proposes relationship termination costs and relationship 
benefits as sources of commitment; communication and opportunistic behavior as 
sources of trust; and shared values as a source of both trust and commitment (see 
Figure 1, also Morgan and Hunt 1994, 24).  These five sources are necessary 
conditions to produce (or, in the case of opportunistic behavior, to reduce) trust and 
commitment.  While the literature concerning trust and commitment is relatively 
extensive, the extant literature relating to their precursors in the KMV Model varies in 
scale and scope.  As discussed in the following sections, many of the antecedent 
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constructs in the KMV Model have been conceptualized slightly differently in the 
marketing literature. 
Relationship Termination Costs 
Relationship termination costs are influential in relationships insofar as parties 
will be reluctant to enter any arrangement from which it will be difficult to disengage.  
Relationship termination costs are all losses expected due to termination and are a 
result of the perception of a lack of comparable potential alternative partners, 
expenses of dissolving the relationship, and/or substantial switching costs (Morgan 
and Hunt 1994, p. 24).  These costs may have one or more components, one of which 
is switching costs.  Switching costs entail the expense of seeking alternative partners 
after the cessation of a relationship.  Relationship termination costs are theorized by 
Morgan and Hunt as positively influencing relationship commitment, while Dwyer, 
Schurr, and Oh (1987) suggest that the expectation of high switching costs in a buyer-
supplier relationship leads to the concern at least for one party (the buyer) to sustain a 
long-term, significant relationship.  The presence of idiosyncratic investments 
magnifies switching costs (Heide and John 1988).  Idiosyncratic investments are 
those of knowledge, capital, or personnel that are difficult or impossible to apply in 
another buyer-supplier relationship (Heide and John 1988, Jackson 1985, Anderson 
and Weitz 1992).  Idiosyncratic investments, also referred to as relationship-specific 
or transaction-specific investments, are a central concept in transaction cost analysis 
(Williamson 1985, p. 30; Heide and John 1988) as an antecedent to increased levels 
of integration.  In their empirical study of business-to-business markets, Cannon and 
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Perreault (1999, p. 443) similarly propose “relationship-specific adaptations” as being 
a reflection of “an aspect of calculative commitment in business relationships.” 
 Switching costs are, however, only one component of relationship termination 
costs, and indeed are not even incurred if no alternative relationship is sought after 
dissolution.  There may be expected costs due to “perceived lack of comparable 
alternative partners” (Morgan and Hunt 1994) or high exit barriers such as the equity 
sharing entailed in international joint ventures (Morgan and Hunt 1994, Lin and 
Germain 1998).  In case studies of strategic alliances, Inkpen and Ross (2001, 134) 
also cite negotiation costs, negative perceptions among competitors of terminating 
alliances, and alliance endgames leaving partner companies “stuck in an almost 
endless loop of poor performance and conflict over how to end the alliance” as 
components of relationship termination costs. 
 Relationship termination costs, when they lead to increased commitment, 
reflect a level of mutual dependence.  In examining vendor-retailer relationships, 
Ganesan (1984) explains that dyads that are overly asymmetrical in dependence will 
not be profitable for the dependent party over the long term, and since such dyads 
often exist due to perceived lack of comparable alternatives, dissolution is not a 
feasible solution either.  Therefore, Ganesan argues (p. 4), a long-term equilibrium of 
sorts is achieved through offsetting investments (Heide and John 1988, Buchanan 
1992) and investment in “bonding behavior” that may include a buyer’s developing 
personal relationships with customers of a supplier’s product and specializing 
ordering, shipping and servicing procedures (Heide and John 1988).  In the 
transaction cost analysis literature such behaviors constitute “credible commitments” 
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that help sustain a relationship by binding parties more closely to each other 
(Williamson 1985). 
Relationship Benefits 
Firms that provide comparatively higher benefits will be not only more highly 
sought as partners but their partners will in turn be more highly committed after a 
relationship is initiated.  Thibaut and Kelly (1959) conceptualize relationship benefits 
as an “evaluation of outcomes” given “comparison level” (CL).  CLalt represents the 
comparison level of alternatives and is defined as “the lowest level of outcomes a 
member will accept in the light of available alternative opportunities” (p. 21).  Such 
alternatives may include other relationships or no relationship at all.  Therefore, 
relationship benefits are theorized in Morgan and Hunt (1994) and elsewhere in the 
literature (Anderson and Narus 1990) as a relative construct seen in comparison with 
relationship alternatives.  In addition, Thibaut and Kelley note that the ultimate factor 
upon which relationship formation depends is “whether or not the jointly experienced 
outcomes are above each member’s” comparison level for alternatives (p. 23, 
emphasis in the original). 
Relationship benefits have been modeled in the marketing literature with 
regard to co-marking alliances, wherein project payoff has a direct relationship to 
perceived alliance effectiveness (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).  Similarly, Holm et al. 
(1996, p. 1039) model relationship profitability as positively associated with 
relationship commitment in a bi-directional relationship.  In the supply chain 
literature, buyer relationship benefits have been proposed as having a direct effect on 
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buyer relationship commitment, as well as indirect effects, including increased trust 
and decreased risk of opportunism (Moore 1998). 
Shared Values 
 Firms that have overlapping ideas of what is right or wrong or high- or low-
priority are more likely to trust one another and enter into committed relationships 
than firms that do not share many similar values, all else equal.  Shared values are 
proposed in the KMV Model as antecedent to both trust and relationship 
commitment.  Morgan and Hunt conceptualize shared values as “the extent to which 
partners have beliefs in common about what behaviors, goals, and policies are 
important or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, and right or wrong” (p. 25).  
The concept of shared values corresponds to “norms” as defined by Thibaut and 
Kelley (1959, p. 129) (“a behavioral rule that is accepted, at least to some degree, by 
both members of the dyad”) and Heide and John (1992, p. 34) (“relational exchange 
norms are based on the expectation of mutuality of interest, essentially prescribing 
stewardship behavior, and are designed to enhance the well-being of the relationship 
as a whole”).  Also related to the concept of shared values is that of organizational 
culture (Enz 1988).  Hofstede et al. (1990, p. 286) explain organizational/corporate 
culture as having the characteristics of being “holistic, historically determined, related 
to anthropological concepts, socially constructed, soft, and difficult to change.” 
 In addition to Morgan and Hunt, other authors have proposed shared values as 
antecedents to trust and/or commitment.  Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) theorize 
“norm development” as a subprocess of the “exploration phase” which precedes 
commitment, and that the establishment of shared values helps to sustain mutual 
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investment in the relationship at the commitment phase.  In the supply chain 
literature, shared values have also been empirically modeled (Parsons 2002) and 
theoretically proposed (McAfee, Glassman, and Honeycutt 2002) as directly affecting 
interfirm relationship quality.  Jap and Ganesan (2000) empirically model relational 
norms as a moderating effect on the transaction specific investment-commitment 
relationship in retailer-supplier dyads, as well as hypothesize a direct relational 
norms-commitment relationship.  Nicholson, Compeau, and Sethi (2001, p. 5), 
defining “similarity of business values” as existing “when the buyer believes that his 
or her business values are similar to that of the trading partner,” model shared values 
as antecedent to trust and having direct, indirect, and spurious effects. 
Communication 
 Communication is also critical in relationship formation, as firms will find 
difficulty trusting a partner that is unwilling to share key information.  
Communication is modeled by Morgan and Hunt as an antecedent of trust, and as 
such, as having an indirect relationship with commitment.  Write Dwyer, Schurr and 
Oh (1987, p. 17), “a relationship seems unlikely to form without bilateral 
communication of wants, issues, inputs, and priorities.”  Anderson and Narus (1990) 
comment on the lack of consensus as to the directionality of the communication-trust 
relationship.  However, they propose a static model, which limits communication to 
the past and therefore as antecedent to trust.  Anderson and Weitz (1989, p. 315) state 
that communication enhances trust through dispute resolution, alignment of 
expectations and perceptions between parties, and reduction of role ambiguity, 
particularly since much communication is informal.  Studying market research 
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relationships, Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpandé (1993) hypothesize that the 
perception of timely communication heightens trust.  While Anderson and Weitz 
(1989) also model communication as positively related to trust, they also model the 
relationship as bi-directional.  Mohr and Nevin (1990) theorize that in “mutually 
supportive and trusting climates” (i.e., in relational channels, as opposed to marketing 
channels) communication is more frequent and bi-directional, and uses more informal 
modes and indirect content.  They propose that a fitting of a “collaborative” 
communications strategy with the aforementioned combination of characteristics with 
a climate of support and trust yields an outcome of higher commitment, satisfaction, 
and coordination than would an “autonomous” strategy of lower frequency, greater 
unidirectionality, more formal modality and more direct content.  Anderson and 
Weitz (1992), in a study of distribution channel dyads, do not include trust in their 
model, but include communication as an exogenous construct positively related to 
reinforcing dyad commitment.  Similarly, Mohr, Fisher, and Nevin (1996) empirically 
model a direct effect between communication and commitment, but not trust. 
 Communication may be seen as having the facets of frequency, direction, 
modality and content (Mohr and Nevin 1990), or measured along dimensions of 
direction and intensity (Van de Ven 1976), although communication may be viewed 
more generally as “meaningful and timely information” shared between firms, both 
formally and informally (Anderson and Narus 1990, p. 44).  Communication is also 
similar to the concept of information sharing or information exchange in the 
marketing literature (Cannon and Perreault 1999, Lusch and Brown 1996, Heide and 
John 1992).  Here the distinction is that information exchange or sharing is treated as 
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a relational norm, an expectation of a degree of communication, whereas 
communication (“collaborative communication”) itself is generally treated with 
respect to the qualities and/or quantities of communication behaviors (Mohr, Fisher, 
and Nevin 1996, note 2 p. 105).  While Cannon and Perreault (1992) do not include 
trust or commitment in their treatment of buyer-supplier relationships, they submit 
that both concepts are nevertheless associated with the “relationship connectors” 
proposed in their scheme of relevant constructs, of which information exchange was 
one (“sharing proprietary information is unlikely to occur in the absence of trust,” p. 
441).  In the supply chain literature, Daugherty, Meyers, and Richey (2002) have 
compared communications to information systems support in reverse logistics 
relationships, including measures relating to information frequency and quality.  
Communication has been proposed and empirically tested as positively influencing 
buyer-supplier relationship quality (Parsons 2002) and performance (Stank, Crum, 
and Arango 1999).  Moore (1998) theorizes both direct and indirect (through the 
mediating effects of trust, risk of opportunism, relationship effectiveness and 
relationship conflict) relationships between information exchange and commitment. 
Opportunistic Behavior 
 Firms that are perceived to be taking advantage of the other in a relationship 
will be considered less trustworthy; hence, opportunistic behavior leads to a 
decreased level of trust.  Opportunistic behavior is a concept arising from the 
transaction cost analysis literature (Williamson 1975, 1985), and is modeled by 
Morgan and Hunt as a negative influence on trust.  Opportunism as defined by 
Williamson (1975, p. 9) “refers to a lack of candor or honesty in transactions, to 
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include self-interest seeking with guile.”  Write Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987, p. 12), 
“The basis for future collaboration may be supported by implicit and explicit 
assumptions, trust, and planning.” 
 In a comprehensive review of opportunism, Wathne and Heide (2000) discuss 
the forms, value outcomes, and governance strategies for controlling opportunism.  
Their typology of forms of opportunism in one dimension divides them into new and 
existing circumstances, of which the existing form is more relevant to the static KMV 
Model.  The other dimension delineates behaviors as either passive or active, both 
types of which are operationalized by Morgan and Hunt.  One effect of opportunistic 
behavior is the establishment of safeguards such as monitoring, whose initiation has 
an implicit assumption of reduced trust in the relationship. 
Opportunistic behavior has been theorized as negatively associated with 
expectation of future interactions (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000, Hill 1990, John 1984) 
and trust (Wong and Chan 1999, Moore 1998, Blau 1964, pp. 97ff.).  Morgan and 
Hunt conceptualize opportunistic behavior as the perception of such behavior, which 
is sufficient to decrease trust.  Parkhe (1993, p. 804) implies an inverse relationship 
between perceived opportunistic behavior and trust by hypothesizing a positive 
relationship between perceived opportunism and contractual safeguards, based on 
game theory and transaction cost analysis. 
 In an empirical study of logistics alliances, Moore (1998) proposes a negative 
direct relationship between risk of third-party opportunism and commitment.  Moore 
and Cunningham (1999) hypothesize effective logistics relationships as possessing 
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lower levels of opportunism and higher levels of trust.  However, Moore and 
Cunningham propose no causal link between the two constructs. 
Outcomes of Trust and Commitment
Acquiescence 
 Once a firm has committed to a relationship, it is more likely to accede to the 
requests given by the partner.  Acquiescence is an outcome of relationship 
commitment in the KMV Model, defined by Morgan and Hunt as “the degree to 
which a partner accepts or adheres to another’s specific requests or policies” (p. 25).  
Adopting the same definition, Hewett and Bearden (2001) include acquiescence in 
their model of marketing headquarters-subsidiary relationships.  However, their 
model posits acquiescence as a direct effect of trust rather than commitment, which is 
not included in their model.  In a study of buyer-supplier relationships, Cannon and 
Homburg (2001, p. 33) include “relationship-specific adaptation” in their model as an 
exogenous construct, defined as “changes in process, product, or procedures specific 
to the needs of a particular customer.” 
 Acquiescence has parallel concepts in the literatures.  In a study of supplier-
reseller relationships, Kumar et al. (1992, p. 240) conceptualize compliance as the 
reception given by a partner to the other’s channel policies and programs.  A high 
level of commitment is necessary to promote stability for compliance, especially 
given that the partners’ goals may be incongruent at a given time.  Also similar to 
acquiescence is the concept of flexibility.  The primary distinction in the various 
literatures is that flexibility involves not only responses to the requests or policies of 
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the other partner, but to responses to changes in the environment outside the dyad.  
Another common distinction is that often flexibility is modeled for only one member 
of the dyad (as with Cannon and Homburg’s conceptualization of relationship-
specific adaptations).  Heide and John (1992, p. 35) list flexibility as a relational norm 
and define it as “a bilateral expectation of willingness to make adaptations as 
circumstances change.”  Bello and Gilliland in one questionnaire item measure 
flexibility as “flexibility in response to requests for changes is a characteristic of both 
parties” (p. 31).  However, in some pieces (Cannon and Perrault 1999, Heide 1994, 
Bello and Gilliland 1997, Lusch and Brown 1996) the operationalizations of 
flexibility are also similar to cooperation as defined by Morgan and Hunt. 
Propensity to Leave 
Once a firm has committed to a valuable relationship, it will be less likely to 
leave the relationship in the foreseeable future.  Propensity to leave is a construct 
modeled as negatively associated with commitment in the KMV Model.  As Morgan 
and Hunt’s model is static, propensity to leave is a perception of the likelihood that 
the partner would dissolve the relationship “in the (reasonably) near future” (p. 26).  
In a study of manufacturer-independent sales agent dyads, Anderson and Weitz 
(1992) model propensity to leave as its converse, perceived continuity of relationship.  
Trust was hypothesized as antecedent and directly causal to perceived continuity, but 
also had a spurious relationship in the model through communications. 
 Similar and converse to Morgan and Hunt’s conceptualization of propensity to 
leave is that of “long-term orientation” as defined in much of the relational marketing 
literature (Lusch and Brown 1996, Ganesan 1994).  This construct, which like the 
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others in the KMV is based on the perceptions of the relationship partners, is to be 
distinguished from Hofstede’s (2001) conceptualization of long-term orientation as a 
dimension of national culture.  Ganesan (1994, p. 3) explains that long-term 
orientation entails “both the desire and utility of a buyer toward having a long-term 
relationship.”  He models trust as a (two-dimensional) direct influence on long-term 
orientation. 
Cooperation 
 When firms are engaged in a committed and trusting relationship, working 
together to achieve common goals becomes more frequent and feasible.  Cooperation 
is theorized as an outcome of both commitment and trust in the KMV Model.  
Cooperation has been conceptualized primarily from the perspective of motive, from 
relations or situations, or from behaviors (Chen, Chen, and Meindl 1998).  As 
conceptualized by Morgan and Hunt, cooperation is treated as the mutual perception 
of a situation in which the two parties are acting congruently.  In addition, 
cooperation entails the active participation by one or both actors toward sustaining the 
relationship, whereas acquiescence reflects a passive acceptance of one partner to the 
requests of the other (Morgan and Hunt 1994, p. 26, see also Cannon and Perreault 
1999, p. 443).  In order for a given member of a group to behave cooperatively, it is 
first necessary for that actor to be reliable and prepared to do so (Thibaut and Kelley 
1959, pp. 257-58).  Frazier (1983, p. 73) states that cooperation “reflects the firms’ 




Hewett and Bearden (2001, p. 53) model cooperation, defined as 
“complementary coordinated actions taken by [the partners] to achieve mutual 
outcomes,” as being caused directly by trust.  Anderson and Narus (1990, p. 45) 
define cooperation as “similar or complementary coordinated actions taken by firms 
in interdependent relationships to achieve mutual outcomes or similar outcomes with 
expected reciprocation over time,” reflecting a conceptualization that is dynamic and 
behavioral as opposed to Morgan and Hunt’s static, situational perspective.  Like the 
KMV model, that of Anderson and Narus posits trust as antecedent to cooperation.  
However, some measure of acquiescence as defined by Morgan and Hunt is included 
in the construct of cooperation as operationalized by Anderson and Narus (p. 49). 
 Cooperation has also been associated, or even synonymous with, trust in game 
theory literature (Parkhe 1993, Hill 1990), particularly as it relates to opportunism or 
“cheating” by the other player in a prisoner’s dilemma dyad.  However, cooperation 
in such settings nevertheless implies a level of trust necessary before the choice is 
made by a player to cooperate, rather than cheat.  Firms are more disposed to 
cooperate when their partners have demonstrated trustworthiness (Hill 1990).  
Cooperation is possible when the goals of each actor are positively related to each 
other, and are recognized as such (Chen, Chen, and Meindl 1998).  “Cooperative 
norms” as defined by Cannon and Perreault (1999) and Siguaw, Simpson, and Baker 
(1998) overlap with flexibility and solidarity, two of the relational norms described 




 Parties involved in trusting relationships are more likely to make efforts to 
insure that conflicts be more constructive than destructive in nature; they are more 
prone to recognize good intentions in the other party.  While conflict is never absent 
in relational exchanges (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987), those that are associated with 
a high level of trust are theorized to have a greater presence of conflict that is 
“functional.”  An early discussion of functional conflict is presented by Deutsch 
(1969, p. 19), writing that functional conflict provides a “medium through which 
problems can be aired and solutions arrived at.”  He also notes that the stronger, more 
salient an existing relationship is, “the more likely it is that a conflict will be resolved 
cooperatively” (p. 27).  Assael (1969) also proposes criteria for distinguishing 
between destructive and constructive conflict.  Among the distinctions cited for 
conflict to be constructive were frequent and effective communication and the 
standardization of modes of conflict resolution, and that “organizations should 
encourage a continuous reappraisal of policies to maintain flexibility in defining and 
fulfilling the economic and organizational requirements of the system” (p. 581). 
 Anderson and Narus (1990), like Morgan and Hunt, model “functionality of 
conflict” as a direct outcome positively influenced by trust.  They define the construct 
as “an evaluative appraisal of the results of recent efforts to resolve disagreements” 
(p. 45).  The authors operationalize functionality of conflict as the extent to which 
disagreements between manufacturers and distributors increase or decrease the 
productivity of the relationship.  Brown, Dev, and Lee (2000, pp. 53-54) include 
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“harmonization of conflict” as a relational norm, defining it as “the extent to which 
channel members achieve mutually satisfying resolution of their conflicts.” 
 Bowersox et al. (1980, p. 81) comment on functional system results in 
conflict.  They distinguish two situations in which channel conflict proves functional, 
based on their respective results: unification of the channel system, or channel system 
adaptation.  The first result occurs when channel members reach the conclusion that 
no alternative relationship exists as satisfactory as the current one, and stress is 
consequently reduced.  The second result occurs when conflict occasions system 
changes that improve distribution performance.  While the second situation conforms 
more to Morgan and Hunt’s conceptualization of functional conflict, Bowersox et al. 
emphasize that the dissolution of an unsatisfactory alliance may be a favorable result 
of functional conflict as well, as long as the net outcome is positive. 
 In a study of international joint ventures, Lin and Germain (1998) 
conceptualize four forms of “conflict resolution strategy”: 1) problem solving, 2) 
compromising, 3) forcing, and 4) legalistic strategy.  The former two may be viewed 
as functional conflict, the latter two as destructive conflict.  Conflict resolution 
strategy is modeled as a mediator between the context variables of cultural similarity, 
relative power, and age and the performance outcome of satisfaction, and the authors 
note that “when conflict resolution processes are properly managed, IJVs are often 
energized” (p. 180).  Problem solving is operationalized as direct discussions, 
attempting to get all concerns out in the open, the offering and the requesting of ideas 
by both partners, and a partner firm demonstrating the logic and benefits of its 
position.  Compromising is operationalized as proposing a middle ground, the use of 
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“give and take,” finding an intermediate position between those of the two parties, 
and trying to find a fair combination of gains and losses for both parties (p. 195).  Lin 
and Germain also propose a positive relationship between relationship age and 
problem-solving and compromising, noting that “[a] party’s reliance on legal 
mechanisms may decline as an IJV ages, since uncertainties regarding the other 
party’s competence, reliability, and other qualities tend to decrease over time” (p. 
182). 
Decision-Making Uncertainty 
 When a party in a relationship trusts the other, that trust can reduce the 
uncertainty inherent in decisions about the future, since trustworthiness renders the 
behavior of the other party more predictable.  In the KMV Model, decision-making 
uncertainty is posited to have an inverse relationship with trust.   Duncan (1972), in a 
seminal piece on environmental uncertainty, describes uncertainty as having three 
components: 1) a lack of information as regards the environmental factors associated 
with a given decision-making situation; 2) not knowing the outcome of a specific 
decision in terms of gain or loss from a correct or incorrect decision, respectively; and 
3) the inability to give probabilities with confidence as to how environmental factors 
will affect the decision-maker’s success or failure (318).  In Duncan’s 
conceptualization the environment is defined as “the totality of physical and social 
factors that are taken directly into consideration in the decision-making behavior of 
individuals in the organization” (314), and possesses the dimensions of simple-
complex and static-dynamic.  Duncan also emphasizes that not only uncertainty but 
also the dimensions of the environment are defined in terms of the perceptions of the 
45 
 
actors in question.  Given that trust entails a level of mutual confidence and 
reliability, environmental decision-making uncertainty is theorized to decrease as a 
result of increased trust (Ring and Van de Ven 1992, 489). 
 Achrol and Stern (1988, 37), adapting Duncan’s definition, defined decision-
making uncertainty as having three components of 1) adequacy of available 
information for decision-making, 2) predictability of the consequences of a given 
decision, and 3) the decision-maker’s degree of confidence at the time of making the 
decision.  In a study of retailer-supplier relationships, Buchanan (1992, 71) 
operationalizes uncertainty as “the degree to which department sales can be predicted 
from past sales.”  Buvik and John (2000, 56) define uncertainty as “the 
unpredictability of the task environment.”  Uncertainty has also been used to describe 
an environment possessing the characteristics of low availability of resources for 
inputs or outputs, high heterogeneity, high concentration, high rate of change and 
high interconnectedness of the processes of change (Arndt 1983, 49). 
Social/Relational Exchange Theory
The purpose of the following section is to present the importance of social 
exchange theory.  Since the KMV Model is rooted in the framework of social or 
relational exchange theory, a rudimentary understanding of that perspective helps to 
understand the basis for Morgan and Hunt’s model.  Relationship marketing refers to 
the treatment of business-to-business or business-to-consumer relationships in a more 
personal and less transaction al manner.  Morgan and Hunt define relationship 
marketing as referring “to all marketing activities directed toward establishing, 
developing, and maintaining successful relational exchanges” (22).  Social exchange 
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theory is grounded in the premise that parties enter into long-term relationships in 
order to accrue additional benefits.  The relationship usually begins with one of the 
parties initiating an exchange.  Further successful interactions then lead to increased 
mutual trust. 
Lambe, Wittman, and Spekman (2001) offer a comprehensive review of social 
exchange theory as applied to business-to-business relationships.  They present the 
four foundational premises of social exchange theory as: 1) that exchange interactions 
result in economic and/or social outcomes; 2) that the outcomes are compared over 
time to alternative exchanges to determine dependence on the exchange relationship; 
3) positive outcomes derived over time increase firms’ trust of their trading partner(s) 
and commitment to that exchange relationship; and 4) that that positive exchange 
interactions over time produce new relational exchange norms that govern the 
exchange relationship. 
 Blau (1964, 91) defines social exchange as “voluntary actions of individuals 
that are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact 
bring from others.”  The need for reciprocation for received benefits in order to 
continue receiving them will serve to initiate social interactions and group structure.  
Even before the establishment of common norms, roles, or goals, the benefits to be 
gained from the exchange relationship provide incentives for social interaction.  A 
network of social relationships and group structure then begins to emerge.  Finally, 
group norms and expectations are more solidified.  Blau distinguishes social from 
economic exchange first by stating that whereas economic exchange entails specific 
obligations, social exchange “involves the principle that one person does another a 
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favor, and while there is a general expectation of some future return, its exact nature 
is definitely not stipulated in advance” (pp. 92-93, emphasis in the original).  Given 
the unspecified nature of future obligations, trust that a partner will fulfill those 
obligations is necessary for social exchange.  Such behaviors also help to create a 
relationship that tends to be long-term, as social bonds in an actor become reinforced 
by remaining obligated to others as well as through a long period of trusting that 
others will discharge their own obligations (pp. 98-99). 
 Thibaut and Kelley (1959), like Blau, present a seminal work to social 
exchange theory.  One of their most cited contributions to relational marketing theory 
is the pair of concepts of CL and CLalt, mentioned earlier here in the discussion on 
relationship benefits.  Also important in their relevance to relational marketing is their 
focus on dyadic relationships in most of their research.  Another key conclusion 
Thibaut and Kelley draw is that the establishment of relational norms may serve in 
place of contracts or other legal mechanisms. 
 Among the characteristics of relational exchange in marketing channels are 
strengthened norms of role integrity, relationship preservation, and harmonization of 
conflict (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000).  Role integrity provides stability and the 
possibility of role expansion.  Relationship preservation reflects mutual perceptions 
of the relationship 1) as distinct from the merely transactional, 2) as to its importance, 
and 3) as to its longevity.  Harmonization of conflict, as explained above, entails 
achieving mutual satisfaction in resolving conflicts. 
 While there is not a perfect applicability, many of the most important 
assumptions and constructs from exchange theory at the interpersonal level provide 
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guidance and insight to interactions among firms.  Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) 
present a model to illustrate buyer supplier relationships along the transaction-
relational continuum.  Their model of buyer-supplier relationships is measured along 
two axes, one representing net expected benefits of the supplier and the other those of 
the buyer.  It is when the levels of net expected benefit are high in absolute terms for 
both partners that “bilateral relationship maintenance” emerges (p. 15).  They cite 
both the literature on marriage relationships to describe their framework for buyer-
seller relationships and the work of Thibaut and Kelley (1959) to describe the 
transitions between phases.  Drawing on both streams of research, Dwyer, Schurr, and 
Oh list five stages of marketing relationship development: 1) awareness, 2) 
exploration, 3) expansion, 4) commitment, and 5) dissolution.  In the awareness 
phase, each party unilaterally assesses various exchange partners against alternatives.  
In the exploration phase, interaction occurs and interdependence gradually increases 
as the young relationship is tested; in this phase termination of the relationship is 
uncomplicated.  The expansion phase entails deepening interdependence resulting 
from both dyad members’ satisfaction with their roles.  Finally, in the commitment 
phase shared values and adopted structures of governance fortify sustained 
interdependence and the relationship is marked by consistent and significant mutual 
inputs as well as conflict resolution and adaptation.  However, the very nature of the 
firm as a collective of individuals entails differences and qualifications in applying 
the tenets of interpersonal social exchange theory to interfirm relationships.  For 
example, while Ring and Van de Ven (1994) propose that “[i]nformal psychological 
contracts increasingly compensate or substitute for formal contractual safeguards as 
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reliance on trust among parties increases over time,” they also propose that the 
formalization of informal understanding commitments will occur “when the temporal 
duration of interorganizational relationships is expected to exceed the tenure of 
agents” (pp. 105-06). 
 Frazier (1983) also proposes a framework for interfirm exchange.  The 
framework includes a series of processes of initiation, implementation, and review.  
In the initiation process, firms seek to commence exchange relationships within 
marketing channels.  At the start of the implementation process, exchanges of 
services products and information begin between the firms and personnel interact 
consistently.  Frazier models the process as also consisting of subprocesses of 
achieved influence, goal compatibility, role satisfaction, manifest conflict, conflict 
resolution and, finally, cooperation and effort.  The review process is an evaluation of 
the rewards and/or losses achieved by each firm as a result of the exchange.  Similar 
to the expansion phase of Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987), Frazier models the set of 
processes as a loop, with the processes as highly interactive and ultimately renewing 
the relationship as a result of each partner’s satisfaction with the role performance of 
the other and the related rewards. 
Wilson (1995) proposes a relationship framework similar to Dwyer, Schurr, 
and Oh (1987).  In the first phase of his model, “partner selection,” Wilson posits a 
more active firm pair than that of the “awareness” phase of Dywer, Schurr, and Oh 
wherein partners may already be conducting business and a deeper relationship is 
sought by one or both actors.  The second phase, “defining purpose,” is influenced by 
the importance of communication in the literature.  The third phase, “setting 
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relationship boundaries,” entails processes that may (in the case of joint ventures) or 
may not possess a legal and explicit nature.  Wilson’s fourth phase, “creating 
relationship value,” entails deriving benefits from the new partnership that would 
have been unattainable by each firm independently.  It is in this phase that 
relationship-specific investments (in Wilson’s words, “nonretrieveable investments”) 
assume a prominent role.  In addition, cooperation and commitment are active in this 
phase.  Finally, in the “relationship maintenance” phase Wilson views variables such 
as trust and satisfaction as becoming latent, as “they are issues that have been or do 
not need the active involvement of those who manage the relationship” (343). 
 With regard to business relationships, social exchange theory emphasizes two 
salient characteristics.  First, the development of a dyadic business relationship 
requires that both members consider the exchange worthwhile.  Second, because they 
result from relationships between individual members of each firm, cooperation in 
such relationships is largely informal in nature (Holm et al. 1996). 
Transaction Cost Analysis Theory
The purpose of the following section is to provide a brief introduction to 
transaction cost analysis theory.  The primary relevance of the theory is by contrast: if 
social exchange theory, upon which the KMV Model is set, concerns relationships as 
the unit of analysis, transaction cost analysis treats the transaction as the primary unit 
of interest.  In addition, transaction cost analysis theory has provided valuable 
concepts into the discussion of relationship formation, including the goal of reducing 
opportunistic behavior and the concept of asset specificity (which, as discussed 
below, is related to the concept of relationship termination costs).  If relational 
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marketing may be viewed as one end of a continuum, the other end would be 
anchored in the discrete transaction (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987).  The theory of 
transaction cost analysis explains the basis for the firm’s existence as “transaction 
costs,” which include the costs of thought, planning, and contracting associated with 
each transaction. An early basis of transaction cost analysis is the work of Coase 
(1937).  A central tenet of transaction cost analysis is that firms may be able to reduce 
costs if some transactions are internalized rather than conducted in the market.  
Transaction cost analysis has provided the theory for much of the research on 
marketing channels and other relationships between firms (Anderson and Weitz 1992, 
Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Buvik and John 2000; Ganesan 1994; Heide 1994; Heide 
and John 1988, 1992; John 1984; Stump and Heide 1996; Wathne and Heide 2000; 
Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). 
 Williamson (1978, 1985), building upon Coase’s foundation, advances that 
transaction costs become increasingly relevant whenever actors in an economic 
exchange invest in relationship-specific assets.  Transaction cost analysis is based on 
two assumptions: First, one of “bounded rationality” – that limits on knowledge, 
foresight, skill and time restrict the abilities of individuals in complex situations; and 
second, an assumption of opportunism, that economic agents will seek to disguise, 
hide and confuse others to make the most of transactions.  In addition, there are three 
dimensions of transaction costs.  The first is transaction frequency.  The higher the 
number of transactions, the higher will be the costs associated.  Hence, firms think of 
internalizing those operations with high frequency of transaction.  The second 
dimension is “asset specificity,” the degree to which some assets (geographic, 
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physical, capital, human etc.) are of value primarily to one firm.  The last dimension 
of transaction costs is that of uncertainty, which is due to bounded rationality.  
Uncertainty assumes three types: primary uncertainty (general inability to predict the 
future), secondary uncertainty (lack of communication between actors), and 
behavioral uncertainty (strategic opportunistic behavior about disclosure of 
information).  
In transaction cost analysis, the transaction itself is the unit of analysis.  As 
noted above, Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) view discrete transactions as one end of 
the relational continuum, emphasizing that “[d]iscrete transactions are characterized 
by very limited communications and narrow content.”  The authors state that 
departure from discreteness of transactions forms the basis for a strong supplier base 
or customer franchise, noting that the root of “future collaboration may be supported 
by implicit and explicit assumptions, trust, and planning.  Relational exchange 
participants can be expected to derive complex, personal noneconomic satisfactions 
and engage in social exchange” (12, emphasis in the original). 
 In this context, the open or traditional spot market is increasingly seen as less 
important relative to other means of governing exchange.  The concept of governance 
may be defined as “a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing the initiation, 
termination, and ongoing relationship maintenance between a set of parties” (Heide 
1994, p. 72).  Based on the assumptions of transaction cost analysis, firms will choose 
between a market-based price mechanism for governance, or a solution based on 
integrated structure of authority, or “hierarchy,” as a means of governance.  There is 
also a distinction between “unilateral/hierarchical” and “bilateral” forms of non-
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market governance along several dimensions.   First, in its initiation bilateral 
governance is typically based on selective entry and value training (versus skill 
training for unilateral/hierarchical governance).  Second, regarding relationship 
maintenance, bilateral governance typically entails overlapping roles (versus 
individualized roles as applied to the whole relationship), joint planning subject to 
change (as opposed to unilateral binding contingency planning), bilateral and 
primarily negotiated adjustments (versus explicit change mechanisms), internal 
monitoring based on self-control (as opposed to external and reactive measurements 
of output and behavior), long-term system-based incentives (as opposed to incentives 
tied to output and behavior), and enforcement rooted in mutuality of interest (versus 
rooted in legitimate contractual authority).  Finally, in its termination, bilateral 
governance is open-ended, while unilateral/hierarchical governance is fixed in length 
or contains explicit termination mechanisms (Heide 1994, Williamson 1985, 75-77). 
 The make-buy decision of a firm is a classic example of a market versus 
hierarchy choice according to transaction cost economics.  The market solution offers 
the advantages of lack of bureaucratic distortion and the potential for aggregation of 
demands that leads to economies of scale and scope.  However, when an input is 
highly specialized (high asset specificity) and of a fixed quantity to be supplied, these 
benefits must be balanced against the costs of negligible economies of scope and 
adaptation (Williamson 1985, pp. 90-91).  In addition, however, there are 
measurement and enforcement costs associated with transactions that constitute a 




are seen to reduce enforcement costs by stipulating in advance the 
terms of trade and arranging for enforcement by third parties, whereas 
the value of a reputation for fair trading, not restricted by any legal 
requirement other than sanctions of social nature, provides the basis 
for confidence in future performance, promotes cooperation, and thus 
creates networks and clusters of relational or implicit contracts (p. 
192). 
 
Between the endpoints of explicit and implicit contractual relationships exists the use 
of “credible commitments.”  As mentioned previously, they are used to bind two 
parties in an exchange relationship more closely together, and this is achieved by 
idiosyncratic investments.  Such investments add stability to relationships by altering 
the participants’ incentive structures to maintain the relationship.  In a study of firms 
purchasing standardized MRO (maintenance, repair and operating) items, 
Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990) conclude that increases in relational contracting 
tend to lower transaction costs under conditions of high external uncertainty. 
In several respects, transaction cost analysis has displayed shortcomings in 
explaining firm behavior.  In addition to Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990), other 
authors (Anderson and Narus 1990, Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987) have demonstrated 
that norms and interpersonal relationships can provide adequate governance, as 
Lambe, Wittman, and Spekman (2001) note.  Even the assumption of universal 
opportunism itself has come into question within the context of relational exchange 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994, p. 25). 
Summary
Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) model incorporates multiple concepts from the 
literature, primarily social exchange theory.  The KMV Model has been a valuable 
and frequently cited contribution in industrial buyer-supplier relationships, but to the 
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author’s knowledge has remained untested in a multi-industry setting of industrial 
purchasing.  The current research addresses the lack of operationalization of the 
KMV Model’s constructs in industries beyond its original sampling frame of retailers 
in a single industry. 
The significance of trust and commitment to social/relational exchange and 
transaction cost theories has been documented; the current study builds on this 
foundation in demonstrating the important of trust and commitment in cementing 
successful supply chain relationships.  In addition, with the increasing importance of 
international buyer supplier relationships and the consequent effects of national 
culture on organizations, the present study will contribute by operationalizing 
important social exchange constructs in the context of relationships that span borders, 




Chapter 3: Model and Hypotheses 
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) offer thirteen hypotheses concerning the 
relationships among trust, commitment, and their antecedents and outcomes.  Figure 1 
(p. 6) displays the relationships graphically.  Since its presentation, other studies have 
tested relationships proposed within the KMV Model, including trust-commitment 
(Garbarino and Johnson 1999, Moore 1998), relationship benefits-commitment 
(Moore 1998, Holm et al. 1996), communication-trust (Moore 1998), opportunistic 
behavior-trust (Wong and Chan 1999, Moore 1998), and trust-cooperation (Hewett 
and Bearden 2001).  However, as of this writing no other study has empirically 
replicated the entire KMV Model comprehensively.  The hypotheses of the 
replication are reintroduced here as they were in Morgan and Hunt (1994): 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between relationship termination costs and 
relationship commitment. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between relationship benefits and relationship 
commitment. 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between shared values and relationship 
commitment. 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between shared values and trust. 
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between communication and trust. 
 
H6: There is a negative relationship between opportunistic behavior and trust. 
 
H7: There is a positive relationship between relationship commitment 
acquiescence. 
 
H8: There is a negative relationship between relationship commitment and 




H9: There is a positive relationship between relationship commitment and 
cooperation. 
 
H10: There is a positive relationship between trust and relationship commitment. 
 
H11: There is a positive relationship between trust and cooperation. 
 
H12: There is a positive relationship between trust and functional conflict. 
 




Chapter 4: Methodology 
Model
The basic structural model follows Morgan and Hunt’s KMV Model (Figure 
2).  Since the first contribution of the current research is to replicate as closely as 




Three industry sectors were selected: 1) fabricated metal products (SIC code 
34), 2) industrial machinery and equipment (SIC code 35), and 3) electronic and other 
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electric equipment (SIC code 36).  This allowed the researcher to obtain a certain 
amount of variance in the constructs and improve the generalizability of the findings, 
yet also control for the occurrence of industry effects.  Furthermore, these sectors 
have a relatively high level of sourcing from overseas (Homburg et al. 2002), an 
important consideration as the survey aimed to elicit a broad variety within the 
sample in terms of international sourcing.  The sampling frame was developed from 
the membership database obtained from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM), 
a source that contains contact details for each member.  A practical consideration was 
that the three sectors chosen had sufficient membership sizes to accommodate a mail 
questionnaire. 
By selecting from among members of the ISM, a population of experienced, 
up-to-date, and strategically involved purchasing professionals is expected to respond 
to the questionnaire.  In addition, the selection of a population of purchasing 
managers from manufacturers allows for a testing of the generalizability of the KMV 
Model.  The population of Morgan and Hunt’s (1994, 27-28) original study was 
composed of decision-makers at the retail level.  One contribution of the present 
study is to investigate whether the sources and benefits of trust and commitment may 
be realized from the perspective of the manufacturer as well as the retailer.  Another 
distinction is that the population from Morgan and Hunt (1994) consisted of members 
of only one industry, compared with the three broad SIC categories of the current 
study.  Conversely, one important similarity between Morgan and Hunt’s population 
and that of the present study is that both sets of decision-makers were evaluating 
relationships with supplier firms.  Finally, the present study differs from Morgan and 
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Hunt with regard to the relationships themselves, as the present study elicited 
responses concerning international suppliers, whereas in Morgan and Hunt (1994), 
the suppliers were domestic. 
Data Collection: Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis is the relationship between a (U.S.) buyer and its supplier.  
Respondents were requested to complete the questionnaire with regard to a significant 
overseas supplying manufacturer.  Respondents were prompted to exclude Canada 
from consideration, to allow for more culturally distant countries in the responses, as 
Canada is a significant trading partner with the U.S. and shares with the U.S. almost 
identical indices along all five of Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture. 
Informant Selection
The original list of potential respondents consisted of over 6,200 members of 
the Institute for Supply Management, a U.S.-based association of supply chain 
management professionals.  Only listings based in the U.S. were considered.  An 
important consideration in mail surveys is that respondents be key informants.  Firms 
in the sampling frame were contacted by telephone not only to identify a key 
informant for the survey, but also to insure that the firm sources directly from abroad, 
to verify the contact details, and to give notice of execution of the study (Skarmeas et 
al. 2002).  This procedure was followed to purify the sampling frame to enhance 
response rate, and eliminated mailings to multiple respondents in the same location. 
 The above procedure reduced the number of targeted respondents, both in 
ascertaining key informants who were willing to respond and in confirming that 
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sourcing was conducted outside North America.  In addition, duplicate personnel 
from the same location were eliminated from consideration.  In addition, entries with 
incomplete contact information were not considered for mailing the questionnaire.  
Ultimately, a sampling frame 700 was derived from the original list after the above 
procedures. 
Survey Execution
Prior to deciding the final version of the survey instrument, pretesting was 
performed to enhance relevance and clarity of the scale items, as well as the overall 
attractiveness of the survey.  Local professionals with experience in corporate 
purchasing served as pretesters.  In addition, the pretests served as a basis for 
adaptation of several of the scale items to be more germane to the sampling frame, 
which represents a completely different population than that sampled by Morgan and 
Hunt (1994). 
For implementing the survey itself, the Tailored Design Method of Dillman 
(2000) was followed.  This method consists of multiple contacts with respondents via 
first class mail and a final contact that differs in mode.  The first mailing was a pre-
notice letter sent before the questionnaire itself.  The questionnaire mailing was sent a 
few days later and included a cover letter explaining the nature and importance of the 
research.  A week after the questionnaire a postcard was sent expressing gratitude to 
respondents and serving as a reminder to non-respondents.  After another week a 




Seven hundred surveys were originally mailed.  One hundred seventy-two 
usable surveys were returned, yielding a response rate of 24.6%.  Those surveys 
provided the data for the initial analyses.  Since the perceptions of non-respondents 
may differ from those who responded to the questionnaire, non-response bias may be 
present.  One means of testing non-response bias is a comparison between answers of 
late respondents of the survey to early respondents (Lambert and Harrington 1990).  
Late respondents more than early respondents answer surveys as non-respondents 
would (Armstrong and Overton 1977).   A t-test was run to test for significant 
differences between early and late respondents along demographic characteristics 
(involvement in international purchasing, total revenues of firm); no significant 
differences were found to exist between the two groups (p = .916).  When testing for 
non-response bias along the constructs of the model, no differences were present; 
after adjusting for alpha inflation (Flynn et al. 1990), a significance level of .004 was 
not met in any of the constructs.  Table 2 provides the distribution of the sample by 
region and countries with 3 or more suppliers, as indicated by their respective 
respondents.  China was by far the most common home country for suppliers among 




Americas Asia Europe and Africa 
Canada 5 China 58 Germany 15 
Mexico 5 Taiwan 16 United Kingdom 11 
Other/Indeterminate 6 Japan 5 Italy 11 
 Malaysia 4 Sweden 6 
 South Korea 4 France 4 
 India 3 Spain 4 
 Other 8 Other 9 
 
Table 2:  Distribution of sample by region of supplier firm indicated by respondent. 
Measures
Measures of all constructs were developed based on extant literature, 
primarily Morgan and Hunt (1994, items listed in Appendix 1).  Originally, the scales 
pertaining to the exogenous constructs (relationship benefits, relationship termination 
costs, shared values, communication, and opportunistic behavior) and endogenous 
constructs (relationship commitment, trust, acquiescence, cooperation, propensity to 
leave, functional conflict, and uncertainty) were adopted from Morgan and Hunt 
(1994).  However, industry-specific considerations required some modifications of 
the scales, as the original instrument used by Morgan and Hunt (listed in the 
Appendix) was in a retailer-supplier relationship context.  Alterations were based on 
either pretests conducted with purchasing practitioners or, when cited, from the extant 
literature.  The final survey instrument is also in the Appendix.  All scales for the 
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construct variables were replicated from Morgan and Hunt, with the following 
exceptions (final scale items listed in Appendix 2): 
For communication, one marketing-specific item from Morgan and Hunt (“In 
our relationship, my major supplier offers us very poor recognition programs.”) was 
dropped.  Another item, “In our relationship my supplier communicates well his 
expectations for our firm’s performance,” was changed to “. . . my supplier informs 
our firm of its expectations in great detail.”  For acquiescence and cooperation, the 
original Morgan and Hunt scales were too marketing relations-specific to be used for 
the current sampling frame.  Therefore, scales from Cannon and Perreault (1999) for 
cooperative norms and seller adaptations were used for, respectively, cooperation and 
acquiescence.  In acquiescence, Morgan and Hunt’s original item read, “In the future, 
my firm will likely comply with the policies that this supplier establishes for the 
marketing of its products by its distributors.”   Cannon and Perreault’s (1999, 437) 
items for seller adaptations were as follows: “Just for us, this supplier changed its 
product’s features”; “. . . changed its personnel”; “. . . changed its inventory and 
distribution”; “. . . changed its marketing”; and “. . . changed its capital equipment 
and tools.”  After pretesting, the wording was changed on a couple of these items.  
The first was changed to “Just for us, this supplier changed its item’s features.”  The 
second item was altered slightly to “Just for us, this supplier changed its personnel 
assignments.”  Finally, the fourth item was changed to “Just for us, this supplier 
changed its subcontractor relationships.”  For cooperation, Morgan and Hunt’s 
original scale items read, “How would you characterize the cooperation between you 
and your supplier regarding the following activities: Local/Regional Cooperative 
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Advertising, Dealer Advertising, Warranty Reimbursements, Dealer Discounts, 
Inventory Levels.”  Cannon and Perreault’s (1999, 447) scale items read, “In this 
relationship, it is expected that . . . No matter who is at fault, problems are joint 
responsibilities”; “. . . Both sides are concerned about the other’s profitability”; “. . . 
One party will not take advantage of a strong bargaining position”; “. . . Both sides 
are willing to make cooperative changes”; “. . . We must work together to be 
successful”; “. . . We do not mind owing each other favors.”  Only one item was 
changed: In the second item, “profitability” was changed to “success” after pretesting. 
In Morgan and Hunt, the scale items for relationship benefits were responses 
to “If you could not buy your stock from your present major supplier, you would 
likely be purchasing from some other major supplier (we'll call this the "alternate 
supplier").  Please compare your major supplier with this alternate supplier 
concerning the following items [gross profit provided, gross profit provided by a 
product line common to both suppliers].”  These were changed to reflect given by the 
supplier in comparison to an alternate supplier, all in response to “Please compare 
your supplier with an alternate supplier concerning [item cost provided, internal 




Chapter 5:  Results 
Testing of the Model: Overview
The analyses follow a two-step procedure based partly on a suggested 
procedure by Anderson and Gerbing (1988).  First, a measurement model 
demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data was developed with confirmatory factor 
analysis.  In the second step, the measurement model was modified to present the 
theoretical KMV Model. 
The Measurement Model
Based on low factor loadings and internal consistency testing (Fornell and 
Larcker 1981), items from some of the constructs (commitment, acquiescence, trust, 
opportunistic behavior, propensity to leave, relationship benefits, and shared values) 
were dropped and the revised measurement model showed higher goodness-of-fit 
(based on χ2 analysis, Bentler and Bonett’s (1980) Non-normed Index, and Bentler’s 
(1989) Comparative Fit Index).  Removal of scale items was considered if goodness-
of-fit could be improved without a significant loss of internal consistency, or if a 
scale’s internal consistency could be increased without sacrificing goodness-of-fit.  In 
addition, items were retained for conceptual reasons (commitment), to retain a 
minimum of two items per scale (functional conflict), or to attain convergence for the 
full measurement model (uncertainty); the details are given in the following section.  
Convergent validity was assessed based on t-statistics given for the factor loadings 
(Anderson and Gerbring 1988); based on significant t-statistics yielded by each factor 
loading, all constructs in the revised measurement model displayed convergent 
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validity.  Discriminant validity was assessed between all of the paired variables in the 
measurement model, using confidence interval testing (Anderson and Gerbring 1988, 
Hatcher, 1994, 337).  In confidence interval testing, the discriminant validity of two 
factors is assessed by determining the confidence interval for the correlation between 
them.  If the confidence interval (of at least ±2 standard errors) around the correlation 
does not include 1.0, then discriminant validity is demonstrated (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988).  In all instances, discriminant validity was confirmed.  Using this 
test, all of the paired variables in the measurement model, including pairs with high 
covariances like commitment-cooperation (.6916), opportunistic behavior-trust (-
.886), and trust-cooperation (.764), exhibited discriminant validity.  
The statistics for internal consistency and goodness-of-fit (for both the 
original and purified scales) are summarized in Table 3, and details of the tests 
follow.  The GFI and χ2 statistics provide basic measures of goodness-of-fit to test 
specification of the model; a ratio of χ2/(degrees of freedom) of less than 3.00 
generally demonstrates adequate fit, while a GFI greater than .900 is desirable.   Most 
scales (all except acquiescence and communication) had χ2/(degrees of freedom) of 
greater than 2, even after purification; however, the results for one or both of the 
other measures of goodness-of-fit (CFI and NNI) were adequate to support the fit of 
the model to the data.  The comparative fit index (CFI) and non-normed index (NNI) 
are two goodness-of-fit measures that have been demonstrated to be less biased in 
smaller samples (Bentler 1989).  Values over .900 indicate acceptable fit between the 
model and the data (Hatcher 1994, 291). 
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After initial purification, a full measurement model including all the variables 
was constructed.  All latent factors were allowed to covary.  The full measurement 
model yielded a χ2/(degrees of freedom) of 28.743/13, a GFI of .951, a CFI of .978, 
and an NNI of .967; the latter three are adequate figures for assessing a fitness of the 
model to the data.   
Table 3: Statistics for latent variables.  Figures for purified scales appear in 
parentheses, Items marked with a dagger (†) beside the factor loading were dropped 
























ESCENCE .789 (.819)   .968 (.999) 
13.790/5 
(.275/2) .964 (1.000) 
.928 
(1.023) 
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cost provided  .421† 4.825
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service  .764 7.361
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To accomplish its 
own objectives, 
sometimes my 
supplier alters the 
facts slightly  .760† 11.313




to do things 
without actually 
doing them later  .908 14.887
To accomplish its 
own objectives, 
sometimes my 
supplier fails to 
provide us with 
the support I 













that my firm has 
with this supplier 
is something my 
firm is very 
committed to  .893 14.252
The relationship 
that my firm has 
with this supplier 
is very important 
to my firm  .906 14.574
The relationship 
that my firm has 
with this supplier 
is something my 
firm intends to 
maintain 
indefinitely  .696 9.913
The relationship 
that my firm has 
with this supplier 
is of very little 
significance to 
my firm  .580*† 7.873
The relationship 
that my firm has 
with this supplier 
is something my 
firm really cares 
about  .599† 8.175
The relationship 
that my firm has 
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expectations in 








that no matter 
who is at fault, 
problems are 
joint responsi-
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work together 
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mind owing 
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TO LEAVE .882 (.940) .851(.859)
129.925/26 
(97.6847/19) .921(.931) .891(.898)
What do you 






within the next 
six months?  .621† 8.704
What do you 






within the next 
one year?  .999 16.557
What do you 
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COSTS .863 .962 16.730/5 .975 .950
I am afraid of 
what might 






lined up  .712 10.506
Leaving this 
supplier right 
now would be 
very difficult, 
even if we 
wanted to  .925 15.445
Our business 
would be greatly 
disrupted if we 
decided to leave 
this supplier now  .940 15.861
It would cost 
very little for my 
firm to leave this 
supplier now  .559* 7.725
The costs for us 
to switch to 
another supplier 
would be very 
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one’s ethics  .551*† 7.448
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must let it be 
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times  .789* 12.125
In our 
relationship, 
my supplier is 
perfectly 
honest and 




can be trusted 





counted on to 
do what is right .923 15.585
In our 
relationship, 
my supplier is 
a firm that I 
have great 









CONFLICT .645  .943 34.347/14 .975 .962 







viewed as “just  
a part of doing 
business”, and 
will likely result 
in benefits to 




















To what extent 







brands to carry 
in stock?   .708 10.174
To what extent 







to carry?  .752 11.053
How confident 
are you in your 




brands to carry 
in stock?  .916 14.827
How confident 
are you in your 




to carry?  .883 13.993
For acquiescence, dropping Cannon and Perrault’s (1999) original first item,  
“. . . this supplier changed its item’s features,” yielded the best goodness-of-fit, and 
increased the internal consistency coefficient for the variable (from .789 to .819).  
Relationship benefits was a new scale created on the basis of pretesting that 
completely replaced Morgan and Hunt’s items.  While the original internal 
consistency of .698 is by convention adequate for a new scale (Churchill 1979), the 
first item, “Item cost provided,” loaded poorly and was dropped, resulting in a higher 
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internal consistency of .739.  Opportunistic behavior with all original scale items 
exhibited high internal consistency (.895) and strong individual loadings, but showed 
a stronger goodness-of-fit with the first item (“. . . sometimes my supplier alters the 
facts slightly”) removed, as well as an increase in internal consistency to .902.  In 
addition, opportunism was compared with trust for discriminant validity; since the 
constructs are conceptually related and opposite, a high correlation among their 
components may be expected.  Using confidence interval testing, the two constructs 
were found to exhibit discriminant validity, effectively eliminating the chance that 
respondents may have associated the two constructs in their replies.  Commitment 
exhibited the strongest goodness-of-fit with the last three items (“The relationship . . . 
is of very little significance to my firm;” “. . . is something my firm really cares 
about;” “. . . deserves my firm’s maximum efforts to maintain”) removed.  The last 
item (“The relationship deserves my firm’s maximum efforts to maintain”), however, 
was retained due to its conceptual importance (as it contains the definition of 
commitment as given in Morgan and Hunt) and that the goodness-of-fit remained 
adequate.  Communication is another scale slightly modified from Morgan and Hunt 
due to industry relevance and pretesting.  Dropping the first item, “In our relationship, 
my supplier keeps my firm informed of new developments” yielded an improved 
goodness-of-fit by all measures despite the significant loading for the first item, and 
only a marginal decrease of internal consistency (from .864 to .856).  Cooperation 
used a scale from Cannon and Perrault (1999) for “cooperative norms,” which was 
more relevant to the population under study, as Cannon and Perrault also surveyed 
corporate buyers in their study.  Retaining all six factors attained the optimal 
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goodness-of-fit and internal consistency of .843.  Propensity to leave yielded a 
slightly stronger goodness-of-fit by dropping the first item (“. . . the chances of your 
firm terminating this relationship within the next six months”), which is also 
conceptually the least relevant as it represents the shortest time horizon.  In addition, 
discriminant validity for propensity to leave versus commitment (the two concepts 
may be strongly negatively correlated) was tested.  Confidence interval testing 
demonstrated discriminant validity between the two constructs.  For relationship 
termination costs, retaining all six items yielded adequate goodness-of-fit, with no 
marked improvement in internal consistency or goodness-of-fit attained by dropping 
any of the items.  Shared values originally demonstrated an internal consistency of 
.846, but dropping the first and lowest loading item-pair (“In order to succeed . . . it is 
often necessary to compromise one’s ethics”) increased goodness-of-fit while 
maintaining internal consistency (.842).  Trust displayed the highest goodness-of-fit 
by dropping the second item, “. . . my supplier is perfectly honest and truthful,” 
although all six original factors loaded well.  For functional conflict, the second item 
(“Disagreements . . . have increased the productivity of our working relationship”) 
exhibited a marginal loading (.539).  However, dropping this item yielded no 
significant improvement in goodness-of-fit by any of the four measures, and the 
maintaining of a minimum of two items was desirable.  Uncertainty exhibited strong 
composite internal consistency and loadings, as well as adequate goodness-of-fit, with 
all original factors retained.  While dropping the first item (“To what extent do you 
now have adequate information for making future decisions regarding which products 
or brands to carry in stock?”) would have yielded higher goodness-of-fit with a trade-
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off in internal consistency as noted in Table 3, it was necessary to retain the item to 
achieve convergence in both the full measurement and structural models.   
Next, a full measurement model was executed.  In the case of one construct, 
uncertainty, a dropped item resulting from the individual measurement model needed 
to be retained in order for the full measurement model to converge.  The full 
measurement model yielded adequate measures of fit: a goodness-of-fit index of .751, 
χ-square/degrees of freedom ratio of 1073.301/753, Bentler’s CFI of .918, and a 
Bentler and Bonett’s Non-normed Index of .906. 
Additional analyses were performed to test for industry effects.  The largest 
industry represented in the data, SIC Number 360 (“Electronic and Other Electrical 
Equipment and Components, Except Computer Equipment), had 78 respondents.  As 
such a small sample would not afford a methodologically possible structural equation 
model, ANOVA was used to test for means differences among the constructs of the 
conceptual model.  The results of the multi-industry analyses failed to reveal any 
significant differences among the construct means of different industries. It is 
possible that there are fundamental similarities in building relationships across the 
industries included in this study, and that different industries develop similar levels of 
trust, commitment, and their associated outcomes and sources. Although the former is 
likely, the latter may be more an artifact of the limited sample size of the present 
study. 
Replication of the KMV Model
Data were analyzed using the SAS System’s CALIS procedure.  The full 
structural KMV Model was run in an attempt to replicate Morgan and Hunt’s results.  
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Like Morgan and Hunt (1994, 30), a rival model was tested along the criteria of 
overall fit, statistically significant parameters, ability to explain variance of outcomes 
of interest, and parsimony.  The rival model proposed only direct relationships 
between the sources and outcomes, without either of the mediating variables (trust 
and commitment), and therefore no indirect effects, with trust and commitment 
themselves as antecedents. 
As purified by the above measurement models, the replicated KMV model 
compared favorably with Morgan and Hunt’s original KMV in goodness-of-fit.  
While a lower GFI was attained (.731 compared to .892 in the original KMV), 
measures such as χ-squared/degrees of freedom ratio (1183.911/797 in the replication 
versus 140.26/43 in the original KMV) and CFI (.897 vs. .890), as well as the 
parsimonious NFI (.689 vs. .555), were comparable to the indices of the original 
KMV Model.  The replicated model possessed a non-normed index of .889 (not cited 
in Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Table 4 shows standard deviations, correlations, 
variances, and covariances for the variables in the analysis.  A substantial degree of 
variance exists within the responses, as indicated by the range of standard deviations 
(from 0.563 to 1.751). 
Figure 3 presents the path coefficients and results of significance testing.  
Table 5 presents path estimates and other relevant model statistics for the replication, 
along with the corresponding statistics from Morgan and Hunt (1994) for ease of 
comparison.  Squared multiple correlations are statistics that are produced in 
structural equation model analyses, and reflect the amount of explanatory power the 
model has for a particular endogenous variable.  They are parallel to R-squared 
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statistics in regression analyses, and are interpreted similarly.  A discussion of the 
statistics presented follows. 
 
Table 4: Correlation/Covariance Matrix.  Correlations are above the diagonal 




Dev. RTC RB SV CM OB RC TR ACQ PTL CP FC UNC 
RTC 1.751 3.065 0.063 0.026 0.048 0.009 0.294 0.058 0.090 
-
0.150 0.116 0.009 0.031 
RB 0.830 0.064 0.689 0.070 0.078 
-











0.004 0.001 1.777 0.323 
-









0.017 0.085 0.197 1.071 
-
0.683 0.584 0.724 0.469 
-
0.343 0.648 0.359 0.269 



















RC 0.850 0.246 0.013 0.157 0.456 
-




0.015 0.409 0.212 
TR 0.563 0.062 0.077 0.252 0.219 
-
0.886 0.510 0.317 0.375 
-
0.238 0.758 0.332 0.155 
ACQ 1.280 0.094 0.101 0.014 0.414 
-
0.300 0.420 0.373 1.638 
-






















CP 0.568 0.120 
-
0.017 0.262 0.467 
-
0.626 0.691 0.764 0.521 
-
0.409 0.323 0.437 0.120 
FC 1.205 0.010 
-
0.037 0.072 0.555 
-
0.230 0.410 0.334 0.350 
-
0.473 0.431 1.451 0.063 
UNC 1.074 0.031 
-
0.042 0.106 0.350 
-




0.195 0.120 0.061 1.154 
n = 149  
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Figure 3: Path coefficients for replicated KMV Model.  Significant figures are in bold type. 
 * -- p <.05 
 ** -- p <.01 
 *** -- p <.001 
 Note: The coefficient for Trust → Uncertainty is significant, but not in the predicted direction. 
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Path Estimates Morgan and Hunt (1994) Replication 
Relationship commitment→Acquiescence .561*** .617***
Tust→Relationship commitment .531*** .416***
Relationship benefits→Relationship commitment -.006         -.045 
Relationship termination costs→Relationship commitment .367*** .133** 
Shared values→Relationship commitment .189**     -.015 
Relationship commitment→Cooperation .252*** .439***
Trust→Cooperation .507*** .455***
Relationship commitment→Propensity to leave -.550*** -.580***
Shared values→Trust .192*** .015 
Opportunistic behavior→Trust -.618*** -.598***
Communication→Trust .184**       .299** 
Trust→Functional conflict .448*** .350*** 








Propensity to leave .302 .245
Cooperation .481 .716
Functional conflict .201 .122
Uncertainty .109 .033
Goodness-of-fit indices





Table 5:  Summary of analyses of Morgan and Hunt (1994) and replicated KMV models. 
 
Precursors of Commitment and Trust 
For the hypothesized paths from the antecedents to relationship commitment 
and trust, relationship termination costs → relationship commitment, opportunistic 
behavior → trust, trust → relationship commitment, and communication → trust were 
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supported; while shared values → relationship commitment, relationship benefits →
relationship commitment, and shared values → trust were not supported.  
Consequently, as measured by the squared multiple correlations, relationship 
commitment in the present analysis compares unfavorably with Morgan and Hunt’s 
sample with regard to how much the direct effects of shared values, relationship 
termination costs, relationship benefits, and trust and the indirect effects of 
opportunistic behavior, communication, and shared values explain the variance in 
relationship commitment (squared multiple correlations (SMCs) of .317 versus .552 
in Morgan and Hunt).  For trust, however, the explanatory power of the present 
sample yields comparable SMCs (.807) to Morgan and Hunt (.743). 
Outcomes of relationship commitment and trust 
 Except for trust → uncertainty, all of the hypothesized paths leading to the 
outcomes of developing commitment and trust (relationship commitment →
acquiescence, relationship commitment → cooperation, relationship commitment →
propensity to leave, trust → cooperation, and trust → functional conflict) were 
significant, with all significant at greater than the p < .001 level.  The absolute values 
of the standardized estimates of each path ranged from .180 to .545 (mean = .406), 
which implies that commitment and trust have some weight in the context of these 
important buyer-supplier outcomes.  The SMCs of each outcome demonstrate mixed 
results in terms of the model explaining their variances: acquiescence = .197; 
cooperation = .716; propensity to leave = .245; functional conflict = .122; uncertainty 
= .033.  Morgan and Hunt’s respective figures for the same outcomes were .315, .481, 
88 
 
.302, .201, and .109.  The trust → uncertainty path was indeed significant (p < .05); 
however, it was significant in the opposite direction from the hypothesized one. 
Rival Model 
Following Morgan and Hunt’s (1994, 30-31) example, a rival model (Figure 
4) was compared to the replicated KMV model.  As with their comparison, the rival 
model here is compared with the replicated KMV model based on the criteria of CFI, 
percentage of hypothesized paths that are statistically significant, explanatory power 
in terms of variance, and parsimony. 
Figure 4: Proposed non-mediated Rival Model to KMV Model (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
With regard to CFI, the replicated KMV model demonstrated only a slightly 
stronger goodness-of-fit (.897) compared to the rival model (.871).  In addition, the 
replicated KMV model demonstrated a slightly superior non-normed index (not used 
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in Morgan and Hunt’s analyses) of .889 versus .856 for the rival model.  Contrarily, 
in terms of the percentage of significant relationships (p < .05) within the model, the 
replicated KMV model (9 of 13, or 69.2%, with the same 9 supported at p < .01)
clearly outperforms the rival model (9 of 29, or 31.0%, with only 5 of its 29 
relationships, or 17.2%, supported at p < .01).  The third criterion, explanation of the 
variances of the outcomes, is determined by comparing the SMCs of the two models.  
The rival model SMCs are acquiescence = .208; propensity to leave = .226; 
cooperation = .649; functional conflict = .215; and uncertainty = .125.  The positive 
increments to SMC in the rival model are .093 (functional conflict) and .092 




Table 5:  Summary of analyses of replicated KMV and rival models. 
Path Estimates Replication Rival Model 
Relationship commitment→Acquiescence .617*** .303* 
Tust→Relationship commitment .416*** --
Relationship benefits→Relationship commitment -.045 --
Relationship termination costs→Relationship commitment .133** --
Shared values→Relationship commitment -.015 --
Relationship commitment→Cooperation .439*** .369***
Trust→Cooperation .455*** .651***
Relationship commitment→Propensity to leave -.580*** -.493***
Shared values→Trust .015 --
Opportunistic behavior→Trust -.598*** --
Communication→Trust .299** --
Trust→Functional conflict .350*** .639***
Trust→Uncertainty .154*     -.322 
Relationship benefits→Acquiescence .099  
Opportunistic behavior→Acquiescence .332 
Communication→Acquiescence .270* 
Relationship termination costs→Acquiescence .004 
Shared values→Acquiescence -.122 
Trust→Acquiescence .521 
Relationship benefits→Cooperation -.093 
Opportunistic behavior→Cooperation .209 
Communication→Cooperation .104 
Relationship benefits→Propensity to leave -.002 
Opportunistic behavior→Propensity to leave -.037 
Communication→Propensity to leave -.128 
Relationship termination costs→Propensity to leave -.021 
Shared values→Propensity to leave -.007 
Trust→Propensity to leave .005 
Opportunistic behavior→Functional conflict .473* 
Communication→Functional conflict .289** 
Shared values→Functional conflict -.002 







Table 5 continued 




Propensity to leave .245 .226
Cooperation .716 .649
Functional conflict .122 .215
Uncertainty .033 .125
Goodness-of-fit indices





The final criterion used for comparing the replicated KMV model with the 
rival model is parsimony.  The KMV Model contains 13 paths, the rival model 29.  
As Morgan and Hunt noted, CFI does not consider parsimony in measuring goodness-
of-fit.  The parsimonious normed-fit index (PNFI) provides a suitable goodness-of-fit 
comparison between models with wide differences in parsimony.  Here the replicated 
KMV model also produces a slight improvement over the rival, with a PNFI of .689 
versus .656 for the rival model.  By comparison, Morgan and Hunt (1994, 30) 
produced an improvement in PNFI from .228 (rival model) to .555 (KMV Model). 
Testing International Effects
The objective of the present research, along with replicating the KMV Model, 
is to consider the effects of national differences on the buyer-supplier relationship.  
Differences among suppliers exist, and the possibility of correlation with nationality 
of the suppliers’ locations warrants investigation.  Here, the testing for effects related 
to national differences is discussed. 
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The first test entailed a replication of the model with a subsample that was 
culturally “distant” from the sample used for the replication above.  The delineation 
used Kogut and Singh’s (1988, 422) formula for calculating Euclidean “cultural 
distance” between two cultures.  This measure of cultural distance is commonly used 
to approximate cultural differences between firms based on nationalities, and makes 
use of weighted variances among Hofstede’s indices of culture.  For nations in the 
sample lacking measures of Hofstede’s indices, four dimensions of Schwartz (1994) 
that are highly correlated to Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions were used to 
calculate cultural distance (cf. Kaufmann and Carter forthcoming).  Nations that were 
indeterminate or lacking figures for either Hofstede’s or Schwartz’s scales were 
excluded. 
 Indices of cultural distance in the sample ranged from 0.07 to 4.00, and are 
listed in Table 6, along with the number of suppliers located in each one.  The figure 
of 1.00 was chosen as a cut-off for the subsample to be compared to the replicated 
KMV Model.  While this figure may seem arbitrary, it in fact provides a useful 
separation for two reasons.  First, respondents in the sample whose cultural distance 
indices were less than 1.00 have suppliers based in either “Anglosphere” countries 
most similar culturally and politically to the U.S. (the United Kingdom, Canada and, 
to a lesser extent, South Africa), or based in highly developed G-8 western European 
countries (Germany, Italy).  The lone exception was Malaysia, which has a cultural 
distance index of 0.94.  Those countries above the 1.00 cut-off included a variety of 
countries from eastern and western Europe, Asia, and Mexico.  The second reason for 
choosing 1.00 as a cut-off is practical, as a higher level would entail reducing the 
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sample to a size unworkable for running a structural model with twelve constructs.  It 
is for this reason as well, that a structural model with solely respondents below the 
1.00 cultural distance threshold could not be run. 
 
Power Uncertainty   Cultural  
Country Distance Avoidance Individualism Masculinity Distance n
Canada 39 48 80 52 0.12 3
China 69 8 20 57 3.07 58
Czech Republic 66 112 27 61 3.66 1
Denmark 18 23 74 16 2.02 1
France 68 86 71 43 1.48 4
Germany 35 65 67 66 0.39 15
Hong Kong 68 29 25 57 2.33 1
India 77 40 48 56 1.61 3
Indonesia 78 48 14 46 3.40 1
Israel 13 81 54 47 1.60 1
Italy 50 75 76 70 0.51 11
Japan 54 92 46 95 2.43 5
Malaysia 13 81 91 69 0.94 4
Mexico 81 82 30 69 3.03 5
Netherlands 38 53 80 14 1.60 2
Norway 31 50 69 8 2.18 1
Romania 90 90 30 42 4.00 1
Singapore 74 8 20 48 3.37 2
Slovakia 66 112 27 61 3.66 1
South Korea 60 85 18 39 3.27 4
South Africa 49 49 65 63 0.32 1
Spain 57 86 51 42 1.67 4
Sweden 31 29 71 5 2.47 6
Taiwan 58 69 17 45 2.75 16
Thailand 64 64 20 34 2.99 2
Turkey 66 85 37 45 2.33 1
U.K. 35 35 89 66 0.07 11
Table 6: Dimensions of culture (Hofstede 2001), with cultural distance (Kogut and Singh 
1988, Kaufmann and Carter 2005).  Right column lists number of respondents’ suppliers per 
country. 
 
The results for the second replication with the more culturally distant 
subsample are summarized in Figure 5.  A comparison of the statistics for each path 
with their counterparts in Figure 3 gives strong, if preliminary, indication that Morgan 
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and Hunt’s KMV Model displays explanatory power even with a more culturally 
distinct subsample of buyer-supplier relationships.  All of the paths, while on the 
whole displaying somewhat weaker coefficients in Figure 3, nevertheless are 
significant in the same relationships, with one exception.  In the culturally distant 
subsample, the Trust → Uncertainty relationship no longer has a statistically 
significant coefficient. 
 Given the larger sample size needed to perform a structural equation model 
analysis on the culturally similar (cultural distance < 1.00) subsample, path analyses 
were performed to allow for some comparison between the two subsamples.  Results 
of the path analyses for both subsamples are displayed in Figure 6.  As regards 
significant paths, the split-sample analyses largely confirm the generalizability of the 
KMV Model, even with substantially smaller subsamples: Of the nine supported 
hypotheses in the replicated, whole-sample KMV Model, eight are supported in both 
subsamples, with the ninth, relationship termination costs, supported in the more 
culturally distant subsample (cultural distance index > 1.00 from the U.S.), but not for 
the culturally similar subsample.  Another noteworthy finding is a distinction in the 
trust→uncertainty relationship.  While in the culturally distant sample no significant 
relationship was determined, in the culturally similar subsample the relationship was 
significant and positive. 
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Figure 5: Path coefficients for replicated KMV Model, respondents with suppliers from countries with 
cultural indices > 1.00 (vs. USA).  Significant figures are in bold type. 
* -- p <.05 
 ** -- p <.01 
 *** -- p <.001 
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Table 7: Comparison of replicated KMV Model with culturally distant subsample. 
 
The results of the split-sample path analyses should be interpreted with 
caution.  Largely owing to the smaller sample sizes, neither path model exhibited 
strong goodness-of-fit with the data: for cultural distance index >1.00, χ-
squared/degrees of freedom ratio = 93.1117/43; GFI = .8778; CFI = .8752; NNI = 
Path Estimates Replication 
Culturally Distant 
Subsample (n = 107) 
Relationship commitment→Acquiescence .617*** .714***
Tust→Relationship commitment .416*** .398***
Relationship benefits→Relationship commitment -.045  .079 
Relationship termination costs→Relationship commitment .133**  .150** 
Shared values→Relationship commitment -.015  .025 
Relationship commitment→Cooperation .439*** .370***
Trust→Cooperation .455*** .536***
Relationship commitment→Propensity to leave -.580*** -.479***
Shared values→Trust .015  .125 
Opportunistic behavior→Trust -.598*** -.526***
Communication→Trust .299**  .294* 
Trust→Functional conflict .350***  .076* 








Propensity to leave .245 .175
Cooperation .716 .682
Functional conflict .122 .061
Uncertainty .033 .017
Goodness-of-fit indices







.8085; and for cultural distance index > 1.00, χ-squared/degrees of freedom ratio = 
62.7884/43; GFI = .8313; CFI = .8766; NNI = .8106.  Neither of the path models 
provides a goodness-of-fit as adequate as either of the structural models. 
 
Figure 6: Path coefficients for path analyses with respondents with suppliers from countries 
with cultural indices > 1.00 (vs. USA), and with cultural indices < 1.00 in parentheses.  
Significant figures are in bold type.   
 
* -- p <.05 
 ** -- p <.01 




Chapter 6:  Discussion 
 
The present study presented a successful replication of the KMV Model.  
However, the results regarding relationships within the model were mixed, and in a 
few cases differed from Morgan and Hunt (1994).  First, the results of the hypotheses 
are discussed.  Next, the replication of Morgan and Hunt’s model is considered, with 
an emphasis on the differences in sampling frames.  Discussions of managerial and 
theoretical implications follow. 
Hypothesis 1 was supported.  The consideration of switching and search costs 
for new suppliers is expected to be acute in international sourcing.  In many instances, 
an international supplier relationship exists due to the difficulty or even impossibility 
of sourcing in the domestic market (Ellram 1991, Monczka and Trent 1992, Petersen, 
Frayer, and Scannell 2000), indicating that the consequently high termination costs 
encourage a more committed outlook by buyers toward their relationships. 
The structural model did not support Hypothesis 2.  It is noteworthy that the 
relationship between benefits and relationship commitment was also the only 
insignificant path found in Morgan and Hunt’s original KMV Model.  While a new 
scale was adopted for the replicated model, as with Morgan and Hunt the construct 
was measured comparatively, versus the benefits of a probable alternative supplier.  A 
possible explanation for the lack of support for the hypothesis may be lack of 
information by some of the respondents about characteristics, or an emphasis on 
absolute rather than relative levels of benefits (Morgan and Hunt 1994, 32). 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 were rejected.  It is noteworthy that shared values 
demonstrated no significant effect on either trust or commitment in the replication.  
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This result is somewhat surprising, given the emphasis on ethics in the scale.  The 
focus of the scale on ethics may have been too narrow; other values or “norms” 
(Heide and John 1992, Jap and Ganesan 2000) may have more influence on trust and 
commitment in the international supply chain context than shared ethical values. 
The replicated model supported Hypothesis 5.  In an international supply 
chain relationship, increased average lead times and more complexities in 
documentation and negotiations increase the need for quality and quantity in 
communications.  Such enhanced communications sustain relationships characterized 
by mutual support and trust (Mohr and Nevin 1990). 
Hypothesis 6 was supported.  Opportunistic behavior’s negative relationship 
to trust was indeed the most significant of all the paths in the replicated model; in 
Morgan and Hunt’s (1994, 30) original KMV Model, the relationship also exhibited 
the highest absolute value of any path coefficient (.618).  This finding may partially 
be due to the sample of buyers with international suppliers.  In an international 
context, trust may be more difficult to establish and maintain than with a comparable 
domestic partner, so perceptions of opportunistic behavior may be even more 
damaging to trust in the buyer-supplier relationship.  In many international buyer-
supplier relationships, transparency with regard to information shared between buyer 
and supplier and about the supplier itself is a common issue, particularly with new 
suppliers from culturally distant countries (Spekman and Davis 2004).  Similarly, 
Kaufmann and Carter (forthcoming) find a positive relationship between behavioral 
transparency (a conceptually opposite construct from opportunistic behavior) and 
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social norms, which include trust, in a sample of internationally sourcing purchasing 
organizations.  
While one relationship was not in the direction hypothesized, all of the 
relationships among endogenous variables in the model were significant.  Hypotheses 
7-12 were all supported by the replicated model.  Accommodating buyer requests, 
cooperative behaviors, and a reduced propensity to leave the relationship were 
demonstrated to be strong effects of commitment in an international buyer-supplier 
relationship.  Similarly, relationship commitment, cooperation, and functional conflict 
were exhibited as strong outcomes of trust in the replicated KMV Model.  Hypothesis 
13 was not supported.  One of the most interesting findings in the replication is that 
not only was the hypothesized relationship between trust and uncertainty not 
supported, but the results displayed a significant (p < .05) relationship in the opposite 
direction (i.e., trust positively affects the level of uncertainty).  One possible 
explanation for this outcome may be the already high level of uncertainty with which 
the population may be contending, given the higher level of volatility in sourcing 
internationally. 
Applicability of the KMV Model to Other Populations
Morgan and Hunt’s original research provided a useful framework for 
examining relational marketing.  The primary purpose of the present study was to 
apply the framework in a different population to investigate whether relationships 
could be characterized similarly.  Three primary distinctions existed between the two 
populations, that examined by Morgan and Hunt and that examined in the current 
study.  First, whereas Morgan and Hunt considered retailers’ relationships with their 
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suppliers, the replication sample was derived from a population of manufacturers 
prompted to respond concerning their suppliers.  A second distinction is that of 
industry: Morgan and Hunt focused on the tire industry, while the current study 
considered a population composed of several different industries (fabricated metal 
products, industrial machinery and equipment, and electronic and other electric 
equipment).   The third important difference between the populations is geographic, 
and related to the second: Morgan and Hunt’s study focused on an industry that, at the 
retail level, largely sources domestically.  In the current study, the population consists 
entirely of buyers sourcing from outside the U.S. 
 The first distinction in the replication concerns the stage at which sourcing 
occurs.  Despite this, there are reasons that a successful replication could be expected.  
Like the population in Morgan and Hunt’s original study, industrial buyers similarly 
operate in a more personal environment, on average, than the typical individual 
consumer.  From the initial sale to future sales and service, many of the interactions 
between firms may be on a one-to-one basis between contacts, particularly with 
valuable or unique products.  One notable similarity in the results between both 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) and the replication was the lack of significance in the 
hypothesized relationship between relationship benefits and relationship commitment.  
Following Morgan and Hunt’s suggestion that future “researchers could address other 
benefits” (32), the researcher replaced Morgan and Hunt’s original items, which 
concerned aspects of gross profit more important to retailers than manufacturers, with 
items suggested by pretesters.  However, the comparative phrasing of the questions 
(comparing benefits of the present supplier with an “alternate supplier”) was retained.  
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Despite the changes designed to gauge benefits more relevant to the population, the 
results did not support the hypothesized relationship. 
 While Morgan and Hunt focused on one narrow industry, the replication 
included three different industries.  One reason for this selection is related to 
sourcing, that the industries selected have traditionally relied on significant overseas 
sourcing (Homburg et al. 2002).  The second reason was for purposes of 
generalizability, insofar as a broadly based replication of the KMV Model can build 
on the foundation laid by the initial, theoretical testing of the model that was the aim 
of Morgan and Hunt in their study (28).  While several of the hypothesized 
relationships in the replicated model were not supported by the results, the overall fit 
of the model suggests that generalizability of the KMV Model may not be the main 
reason for the lack of significance in these relationships. 
 The third distinction between the populations, that of the composition of their 
respective supply bases, is also worth considering with regard to the results.  As 
discussed previously, in the replicated model the hypothesized relationships 
concerning the outcomes received an overall higher level of support in the results 
than those concerning the sources of trust and commitment.  This trend parallels to 
some degree the findings of Morgan and Hunt in the original KMV Model testing.  
With regard to one of the outcomes, decision-making uncertainty (the lone outcome 
of trust and commitment not supported by the replicated model in the hypothesized 
direction), Morgan and Hunt note that it was explained by the lowest amount of 
variance of any of the constructs in the model (32).  As in Morgan and Hunt’s results, 
uncertainty had the lowest amount of variance (3.3%) explained of any construct, so 
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the international sourcing environment in which the population operates may not only 
be more dynamic and complex than that studied by Morgan and Hunt, but the results 
suggest that there may be more uncertainty than even trust can significantly alleviate.  
The finding of no significant relationship in the culturally “distant” subsample 
presents another question.  Why does trust promote cooperation and functional 
conflict among these suppliers, but not reduced uncertainty? 
Managerial Implications
The findings hold important implications for professionals in the field of 
supply chain management.  First, in the hypotheses not supported by the replicated 
model, there may be lessons for supply chain managers.  The finding of a lack of 
significance between relationship benefits and commitment may be indicative of a 
particular perspective in forming buyer-supplier relationships.  Given that the whole 
relational marketing paradigm is rooted in the concept of partners reorienting 
themselves from a “me-first” to an “us-first” outlook, the trend toward moving from 
transactions to partnerships may provide an explanation for the limited contribution 
that the relationship benefits construct demonstrates in the model.  A possible 
explanation is that benefits are a more significant consideration at the initiation of the 
relationship, than a consideration for maintaining the relationship.  While the scale 
used in the model attempted to encompass not only item cost but also quality and 
customer service, further replication of the new scale may provide more insight as to 
the most important benefits sought from a relationship by buyers.  Shared values was 
the other exogenous construct not found to have a significant relationship with trust 
or commitment in the replicated model.  This lack of a significant relationship may be 
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due to the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship, particularly where the partners 
are from different industries.  From the supply chain practitioner’s perspective, the 
quality of the outcome (i.e., the product) is often paramount, and may overshadow 
considerations of the perceived values of the supplier, particularly if that supplier is 
located in a country distant in both culture and geography.  The findings indicate no 
halo effect between perceived similarities in ethical values and the commitment of 
respondents to the relationship, and suggest that supply chain professionals can 
realize benefits from a relationship without feeling an affinity in organizational 
culture.  The contrary finding of a positive relationship between trust and uncertainty 
may be influenced by the greater prevalence of contractual devices in international 
sourcing.  Given that uncertainty itself reflects limited knowledge about future 
conditions owing to a complex and dynamic environment, the phenomenon may 
reflect that respondents most knowledgeable about the untrustworthiness of their 
partners are also most knowledgeable about the future.  In addition, the model 
explained little of the uncertainty in the data (3.3%), which itself may reflect the 
volatility of sourcing internationally today.  Here, the primary lesson for practitioners 
would be to focus on aspects of international sourcing over which some control is 
possible (i.e., behaviors in the relationship: the other four outcomes of trust and 
commitment) and not expect even the best of relationships to meet every contingency 
in the future, particularly the distant future. 
A second consideration for practitioners lies in the international dimension of 
the findings.  When tested in the subsample of respondents whose suppliers are 
culturally distant, the structural model supported the same hypotheses as the model 
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for the whole sample.  For supply chain managers, it is a demonstration that 
hallmarks of successful long-term relationships are common in a variety of cultures 
dissimilar to the United States.  In the subsample of respondents with suppliers based 
in countries culturally “close” to the United States, a path analysis found support for 
the same hypotheses as did the structural model for the entire sample, with the 
exception of relationship termination costs.  This may reflect greater knowledge by 
supply chain professionals of their suppliers in culturally similar countries, most of 
which are relatively well-developed and known in the United States.  In such 
countries, there may be a larger base of potential alternative suppliers available to 
buyers, which would reduce relationship termination costs as a driver of commitment 
to the relationship.  The slightly higher average level of relationship termination costs 
in the culturally “distant” subsample (5.331 versus 4.911 for the culturally “similar” 
subsample) suggests that this may be the case. 
 
Theoretical Implications
The findings support the external validity of the KMV Model in all three 
concepts: statistical generalizability, conceptual replicability, and realism (Lynch 
1982).  While statistical generalizability cannot be extended beyond the scope of the 
study, the findings suggest that extending application of the KMV to other 
populations will provide useful avenues for future research.  The successful 
replication of the KMV Model also supports the conceptual replicability of Morgan 
and Hunt’s model, and indicates that the theory can predict behaviors in different 
types of relationships in other industries.  The use of key informants and pretesting 
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for the sample lends a small amount of support to the realism of the KMV Model; 
however, the supplementing of future replications with case studies will extend the 
realism dimension of external validity further and more definitively. 
Further conclusions can be drawn with regard to specific scales.  Original 
Morgan and Hunt scale items for relationship benefits, cooperation, and acquiescence 
were changed to reflect the different concerns of supply chain professionals in the 
respondent buyer organizations.  The scale items for these three constructs used in the 
replicated model (cooperation and acquiescence from Cannon and Perrault 1999, and 
relationship benefits as a new scale) more specifically relate to the supply chain 
relationship (as opposed to marketing in Morgan and Hunt) demonstrated reliability 
and convergent validity, although in the case of relationship benefits it is 
indeterminate without further replication as to whether external validity is 
established.  The ability of the KMV Model to display replicability with these 
changes in construct measurement is encouraging to the development of theory 
regarding trust, commitment, and their sources and outcomes. 
The study also supported the relevance of the KMV Model to relationships in 
which the buyer and supplier were based in different cultures, thus enhancing the 
nomological validity of Morgan and Hunt’s model.  Of particular importance was that 
nine of the thirteen hypotheses were supported in the whole sample, consisting of 
respondents sourcing from over twenty countries of a variety of cultures.  When 
testing for differences among those national cultures, eight of the nine hypotheses 
remained supported for both culturally similar and dissimilar countries, with the 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This study tested the generalizability of the Key Mediating Variable Model as 
proposed by Morgan and Hunt by replicating the structural model with a different 
population.  The nature of relational marketing was revisited, emphasizing the 
benefits firms can receive through long-term relationships with partner firms.  Noting 
that effective cooperative relationships are vital to firm success, a review of the 
sources and aspects of those relationships was presented.  Central to those sources are 
relationship commitment and trust, two variables proposed as essential to positive 
qualitative outcomes in successful buyer-supplier relationships.  The present research 
found evidence that the KMV Model is applicable to many firms that source globally 
in various industries in demonstrating that commitment and trust lead to beneficial 
and long-lasting buyer-supplier relationships. 
With regard to the sources of trust and commitment, the findings provide 
important implications for practitioners in purchasing.  From a managerial 
perspective, the findings suggest that purchasing managers should devote time and 
resources to reducing opportunistic behavior and enhancing communication in their 
relational exchanges, rather than focusing on shared values or relationship benefits. 
While these latter constructs may be important, they appear to be significantly less 
important as compared to reducing opportunistic behavior and increasing 
communication.  In addition, relationship termination costs may be seen as less a 




Directions for Future Research
While the present study is itself an extension of previous research, the KMV 
Model and the nature of the population offer many directions in which to expand 
further.  The first direction concerns the measurement of the constructs themselves, a 
matter on which Morgan and Hunt also commented (32).  The replication already 
sought to confirm the KMV Model with changes in the measures of some of the 
constructs (e.g., scale items measuring relationship benefits, acquiescence, 
cooperation), of which a few proved to be useful and still hold up well in terms of 
variance and explanatory power.  Nevertheless, additional measurements can be 
sought.  Is may be possible that more conventional supply chain performance 
measures hold relationships with the behavioral constructs in the KMV Model.  For 
example, may common purchasing measures or metrics such as contract length, 
quality certifications, monitoring, and contracts with alternate suppliers be related to 
trust or commitment? 
 Related to the previous question is the matter of performance.  For supply 
chain management professionals, the KMV Model can demonstrate additional 
usefulness if the behavioral outcomes are compared with traditional performance 
measures (e.g., fill rate, lead time, response time) to ascertain more quantifiable 
benefits to a well-maintained buyer-supplier relationship.  Such investigation would 
provide practitioners further evidence to recognize relational benefits that are more 
long-term and are not always immediately discernable to “the bottom line.” 
 The replication studied a population that sources from a wide variety of 
countries for products both common and critical.  While most of the constructs 
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endured as reliable and valid measures in the replication, others seemed to be less so, 
certainly less accurate as predictors or effects of other constructs in the model.  One 
possible explanation may be the effects of culture.  For example, while there may be 
on the part of an American buyer little perception of shared values in a relationship 
with a Singaporean supplier (especially one with whom there has been no face-to-face 
contact), there nevertheless may be a longstanding relationship than can be 
characterized as committed and trusting between them and their respective firms. 
 In addition, with the broad international supply base of the population 
sampled for the replication there may be a source of variation within the results of 
each of the constructs themselves.  Do certain types of cultures lend themselves to 
developing and maintaining longer and higher quality relationships?  While suppliers 
based in, say, China may have obvious attractiveness on the basis of cost, are there 
cultural traits that may make such relationships easier to maintain as well, or do they 
make the relationships less attractive from a non-pecuniary standpoint?  Are certain 
cultures engrained with values or behaviors that incline them to be more (for 
example) acquiescent to business partner requests?  An investigation that incorporates 
a data set including the national composition of suppliers and common measures for 
gauging cultural differences would provide useful insight into buyer-supplier 
relationships that cross cultural as well as political boundaries. 
 Another means of building on the research stream would be in the populations 
studied.  A replication involving buyers from other countries would bolster the 
generalizability of the KMV Model further.  Giving due allowance to time and 
financial constraints, future research incorporating dyads wherein both buyer and 
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supplier perspectives are treated would enhance the body of relational marketing 
research further.  Finally, more in-depth research such as interviews or case studies 
can cast light on the unusual findings from this study, for example the positive 
relationship between trust and uncertainty in the sample. 
Limitations
As with all cross-sectional studies like the present one, demonstrating 
causality is more difficult without the benefit of time.  However, due to the 
constraints of time common to most research of this nature, a longitudinal design was 
not feasible.  Where possible, this research can benefit from a longitudinal study for 
further confirmation of the findings.  Several of the constructs studied (e.g., 
commitment, propensity to leave, decision-making uncertainty) are inherently 
temporal in their conceptualization.  In the case of propensity to leave, the 
operationalization itself has a temporal dimension.  The true gauge of several of these 
factors, and ultimately the attractiveness of the relationship itself, is whether the 
relationship still exists several months, or years, later. 
 A second limitation rests in the sampling frame.  While attempts were made to 
limit bias (by having the population include three industries and randomly assigning 
questionnaires concerning either a “very important” or “moderately important” 
supplier to the respondents), other biases may nevertheless have been present.  For 
example, that the questionnaire was only directed at firms that source internationally 
may have excluded some segments of the investigated industries, such as contract 
suppliers to the U.S. federal government that are required by procurement guidelines 


















If you could not buy your stock from your present major supplier, you would likely be purchasing from some 
other major supplier (we'll call this the "alternate supplier").  Please compare your major supplier with this 
alternate supplier concerning the following items: (anchors: Present supplier is much better/Present supplier is 
much worse)
Gross profit provided
Gross profit provided by a product line common to both suppliers.
Customer satisfaction provided by a product line common to both suppliers.









(anchors: Strongly agree/Strongly disagree)
I am afraid of what might happen if we severed our relationship with this supplier without having another one 
lined up.
Leaving this supplier right now would be very difficult, even if we wanted to.
Our business would be greatly disrupted if we decided we wanted to leave this supplier now.
It would cost very little for my firm to leave this supplier now.







Please indicate the degree tow which you feel that (1) your supplier would agree with the following statements, 
and (2) you would agree with the following statements: (two part question, anchors: Strongly agree/Strongly 
disagree)
In order to succeed in this business, it is often necessary to compromise one's ethics.
Top management in a business must let it be known in no uncertain terms that unethical behaviors will not be 
tolerated.
If an employee is discovered to have engaged in unethical behavior that results primarily in personal gain
(rather than
      corporate gain), he or she should be promptly reprimanded.
If an employee is discovered to have engaged in unethical behavior that results primarily in corporate gain
(rather than
      personal gain), he or she should be promptly reprimanded.






In our relationship, my major supplier: (anchors: Strongly agree/Strongly disagree)
(a)  ...keeps us informed of new developments.
(b)  ...provides us with frequent positive feedback on our performance.
(c)  ...offers us very poor recognition programs.





To accomplish his own objectives, sometimes my supplier: (anchors: Strongly agree/Strongly disagree)
(a)  ...alters the facts slightly.
(b)  ...promises to do things without actually doing them later.
(c)  ...fails to provide us with the support that he is obligated to.
a All measures employ 7-point scales.
b Indicator is a summate of the items shown.















The relationship that my firm has with my major supplier: (anchors: Strongly agree/Strongly disagree)
...is something we are very committed to.
...is very important to my firm.
...is of very little significance to us.
...is something my firm intends to maintain indefinitely.
...is very much like being family.
...is something my firm really cares about.









In our relationship, my major supplier: (anchors: Strongly agree/Strongly disagree)
...cannot be trusted at times.
...is perfectly honest and truthful.
...can be trusted completely.
...can be counted on to do what is right.
...is always faithful.




(anchors: Strongly disagree/Strongly agree)
In the future, my firm will likely comply with the policies that this supplier establishes for the  marketing of its 







How would you characterize the cooperation between you and your supplier regarding the following activities?
   (anchors: Not at all cooperative/Very cooperative)









What do you think are the chances of your firm terminating this relationship... (anchors: Very high/Very low)
(a) ...within the next six months?
(b) ...within the next one year?




(anchors: Strongly agree/Strongly disagree)
In the future, differences of opinion between my supplier and me will probably be viewed as "just a part of 
doing
   business," and will likely result in benefits to both of us.












To what extent do you now have adequate information for making future decisions regarding: (information is 
very adequate/information is very inadequate)
(a) The amount you should spend on local sales promotions and advertising?
(b) How sales promotions and advertising dollars should be spent?
How confident are you in your ability to make future decisions regarding: (I have complete confidence/I have 
no confidence)
(c) The amount you should spend on local sales promotions and advertising?
(d) How sales promotions and advertising dollars should be spent?
To what extent do you now have adequate information for making future decisions regarding: (information is 
very adequate/information is very inadequate)
(a) Which products or brands to carry in stock?
(b) How much inventory to carry?
(c) Which products or brands should be the focus of your sales efforts?
How confident are you in your ability to make future decisions regarding: (I have complete confidence/I have 
no confidence)
(a) Which products or brands to carry in stock?
(b) How much inventory to carry?
(c) Which products or brands should be the focus of your sales efforts?
a All measures employ 7-point scales.
b Item was reverse-scored.
c The Propensity to Leave indicator is a summate of the three weighted items.  Item (a) is weighted four times the reverse-scored 
response.  Item (b) is weighted
  twice the reverse-scored response.  Item (c) is simply the reverse scored response.
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